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Abstract 
Cybercrime costs a total loss of about $338 billion annually which makes it one of the most 
profitable criminal activities in the world. Controlled malware (Botnet) is one of the most 
prominent tools used by cybercriminals to infect, compromise computer networks and 
steal important information. Infecting a computer is relatively easy nowadays with malware 
that propagates through social networking in addition to the traditional methods like SPAM 
messages and email attachments. In fact, more than 1/4 of all computers in the world are 
infected by malware which makes them viable for botnet use.  
This thesis proposes, implements and presents the Self-healing framework that takes 
inspiration from the human immune system. The designed self-healing framework utilises 
the key characteristics and attributes of the nature’s immune system to reverse botnet 
infections. It employs its main components to heal the infected nodes. If the healing 
process was not successful for any reason, it immediately removes the infected node from 
the Enterprise’s network to a quarantined network to avoid any further botnet propagation 
and alert the Administrators for human intervention.  
The designed self-healing framework was tested and validated using different experiments 
and the results show that it efficiently heals the infected workstations in an Enterprise 
network. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
In the increasing cyber-networked world, computers communicate with each other for 
many reasons. Governments, companies and organisations rely on networked computers 
to perform their daily tasks while many people use the internet for personal use. The 
numerous benefits of working within networks has led to commercialisation of the internet 
usage and the birth of very successful companies that provide different applications and 
platforms that enable easier use of the internet.  One of those benefits is easier 
management of information and data.   In the world where evidence of money has always 
led to criminal activity, the commercialisation of internet made networks a possible target. 
Cyber criminals mainly target personal and organisational data and network resources. The 
availability of such information and network resources in large pools on the enterprise 
networks is such a big temptation for the cybercrime world.  The biggest threat to date 
used to steal information and misuse network resources is the botnet. Cybercrime are 
estimated to cost the business and government world $338 billion annually. It is estimated 
that ¼  [1] of all the computers in the world are infected which makes them viable for 
botnet use.  
This thesis details the development of a proposed self-healing framework for enterprise 
networks to combat controlled malware attacks i.e. botnet attack.   
 
 
1.2 Motivations  
Botnets are one of the most popular tools used by cyber criminals that have had a huge 
financial impact on the networking world. This has pushed the network security 
community, corporations and government organisation to combine their efforts in order to 
takedown different botnets [2]. The botnet takedown always involves the hunting and 
shutting down of the main command centre or arresting the botmaster. The processes 
followed are always complex and take a lot of time. Botnet history supports the fact that 
most botnet takedowns result into the development of many and more complex attacks 
[3]. Therefore, network security community is always trying to catch-up with the cyber-
crime world. Recent studies [4] show that botnet attacks have evolved to a point where 
each corporate network is a target no matter the size as long as the data stored or 
resources are deemed useful by the attackers. Most botnet attacks on organisation 
networks are always performed by controlled malware to compromise enterprise networks 
in order to steal data or use the network resource. Since botnets use malware to 
compromise the network computers, standard anti-malware control measures are always 
employed in the network to combat these attacks. However, since the malware is 
controlled, the attacker can evade detection and thus successfully infect the machines and 
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compromise the network. The enterprise network is a controlled environment, a feature 
that can be used as an advantage to fight against the botnet attacks. This study proposes 
and implements a self-healing framework that utilises the controlled environment of the 
enterprise network to make it more resilient against the controlled malware i.e. botnet 
attacks.  
1.3 Aims and objectives  
The overall aim of the thesis is to develop a framework that can ensure the resilience of the 
network nodes in case of a botnet infection inside the enterprise network. To meet this 
goal, the following objectives must be met: 
 Research into the botnet taxonomy and typologies, past and current botnets and 
related threats. 
 Complete understanding of botnets infection techniques, botnet capabilities and 
botnet anatomy.  
 Design a self-healing framework that can be introduced in an enterprise network 
and take advantage of while not to interfering with any network devices or 
services. 
 Build and configure a small enterprise network and have all the common main 
servers and services configured in the enterprise network. In addition to that 
introduce a botnet command and control centre and infect machines. 
 Identify the suitable programming language for this solution. The programming 
language should be strong enough to interact with the system and run fast enough 
to produce the required results in acceptable time. 
 Implement the designed framework and evaluate the efficiency of the self-healing 
framework. 
1.4 Contributions  
The main contribution of this thesis is the design and implementation of the self-healing 
framework for enterprise networks with minimum human intervention against botnet 
attacks. The framework design is achieved by these components: 
1- Self-healing Server this is responsible for understanding and defining the 
workstation states. It manages and generates commands based on what has been 
analysed and diagnosed. The main and critical component of this server is the log 
analyser which was designed to read and understand the logs sent form the 
network agents. The log analyser reads every letter in each line and determines the 
IP address of the machine infected, Location of the file and the type of alert. It 
extracts this information, sorts it so that it is easier for other functions in the 
framework to understand and use. Other components built to enable the 
functionality of this server are the communication and reporting services which 
further detailed later in this thesis.  
2- Client Agent: An agent is created to be distributed on all the machines on the 
enterprise network. This component of the framework understands what to look 
for once it receives a task from the server. The agent is built to be a powerful tool 
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which is able to remove or force close any running process even if it is a locked 
process. It either changes the system state back to the clean state or forces the 
machine off the network if the healing is not successful. 
3- Quarantined Network this addition to the standard enterprise network setup is to 
be used for the isolation of the infected machines whose state could not be 
reversed successfully by the client agent. As it is known that some of botnets use a 
worm like mechanism to propagate within a network, or even launch an internal 
DoS attack, isolation of the machines which need human intervention for 
successful healing is important in order to avoid further network infection. The 
implementation of this design is further explained in detail later in this thesis. 
1.5 Thesis structure  
The rest of this thesis as follows: 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter surveys a number of academic papers and articles most strongly connected or 
related to the work presented in this thesis. It reviews the literature on history and 
developments in botnet technology, topologies, infection techniques and self-healing 
systems over the last few years. It introduces different complex types of botnets and 
botnet capabilities, infections techniques, botnet evolutions, effects and threats. It also 
sheds light on the financial impact that the botnet has had on the world.   
 Chapter 3: Proposed framework design 
This chapter introduces a prototype design of the self-healing framework which aims to 
detects and heal the infected machines. It begins with an overview of the proposed 
Framework and description of all the modules it consists of. It also covers the Self-healing 
Architecture and the relationship between all the compounds that building blocks of this 
framework. 
 Chapter 4: Self-healing framework implementation 
This chapter introduces the suggested framework implementation. This is where all the 
theory behind the proposed design is translated into programming code. In this chapter all 
the systems and components that are essential in the framework progress are discussed in 
detail. It describes the algorithms used in the framework design and presents pseudo code. 
It also details the experiments and the test beds used during the implementation of the 
design. 
 Chapter 5: Results and Analysis  
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the two scenarios that are used to test the 
implemented design.  
 Chapter 6: Conclusions and future work 
This chapter presents conclusion of the thesis and discusses limitations of the research. 
Finally, possible future research areas are presented. 
 
Chapter 1 
  4 
  
  
   Chapter 2 
  5 
  
Chapter 2. Literature review 
2.1 Introduction  
Botnet-type attacks have increased significantly with the advancement of infection 
methods and the increased use of portable devices with computing capabilities.  The 
security threats and damage related to botnets continue to be challenge for security 
personal. One of the main threats of the botnet is its ability to build large computer armies 
that sometimes exceed a million of compromised computer and the possibilities of refining 
itself to remain undetectable for long spells of time. It refines itself by improving its code 
and adding more functions and features which can be viewed as updating its files.  The 
evolution of botnets over the years has shown that there is always a new development 
with each update release [5, 6]. Although the internet security society works to keep up 
with the threats, it is still a chasing game with the botnet authors always steps ahead.     
The enterprise network is the default network setup for almost all large organisations. The 
presence of a large pool of network resources like bandwidth and computing power 
attracts botnet masters. These resources are an earning opportunity for the bot herders as 
they can lease them out to other interested parties for a specific amount [7]. The fact that 
these enterprise networks also store a lot of sensitive information that can be sold creates 
another revenue opportunity for the attackers.  
Enterprise network works under a controlled environment which can be monitored to 
ensure that the network is infection free at all time. Self-healing is one of the mechanisms 
that have been used in other controlled environments that can be applied in this instance 
[8, 9]. Self-healing is best defined by how nature works to protect and evolve against 
attacks. This mechanism has been copied in different ways by researchers in the computing 
world. Self-healing systems rely on the system resources to correct any errors in the system 
in order to ensure the availability and reliability of the system. Its successful application in 
different fields makes it a worthy solution to fend off attacks.  
The following section, covers the definition and anatomy of a botnet, evolution of the 
botnet, types of botnet, propagation techniques and command and control techniques 
employed by the botnet masters and the overall effects of botnet attacks. It also defines 
the enterprise network and its components and introduces the self-healing mechanism, its 
attributes, methods and some of the developed self-healing systems that are related to this 
study. 
2.2  Botnets 
The term botnet is a combination of two words. The first part “bot” is derived from the 
word “robot” while the second part is short for network. Therefore botnet can be defined 
as a software robot that operates as an agent who is capable of performing certain 
commands automatically, repeatedly and simulate human activities. It is also been 
identified as a collection of PCs connected to the internet that work together to accomplish 
a certain task without the knowledge of their owners [10-12].  
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In 1993, the first bot was created as a useful feature in Internet Relay Chat (IRC) by Jeff 
Fisher [13]. It was used to manage the chat sessions and channels for the IRC protocol. The 
features of this bot were then adopted by the first malicious bot running on IRC was called 
Pretty Park Worm [14]. Since then, botnets have grown and evolved to use the latest 
known advanced communication protocols to perform the attacks.  
 
Figure 2.1 Typical botnet with zombies [15] 
 Botnets can be basically divided into three parts:  
a) The bot: This is the compromised computer which forms part the network. 
b) Command and Control centre: A server that is used to send tasks to the bots. It also 
receives and collects information from bots. It is seen as the main point of 
vulnerability in the botnet setup. 
c) Botmaster: This is the owner and/or controller of the botnet.  
Each bot must have the following main attributes:   
 Remote control facility.  
  Implementation of several commands. 
  A spreading mechanism to propagate. 
2.3 Infection Techniques used by Botnets 
The main goal of the botmaster is to continuously grow the network of bots one controls. 
This is done by what is called ‘recruiting’, as the more hosts the botmaster has, the more 
valuable and powerful ones botnet becomes. Therefore, botmaster are keen on finding and 
creating techniques and opportunities to propagate their bots. The infected machines are 
taken advantage of and used as vectors for scanning for any new machines available to be 
exploited.  [16, 17]  give the different ways that are used for botnet infection and spreading 
techniques which are: 
 Emails that use social engineering to pursue the user to download a file. 
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 Instant messaging tools such as MSN messenger, 
 Vulnerabilities of the OS. 
 Script injection 
 USB keys, SD cards  
 Peer-to-Peer sharing protocol. 
 Some websites use complex HTML ‘GET’ command to exploit vulnerabilities by 
running local commands like “wget” or “fetch”. 
 Human curiosity.   
 Network shares. 
 Weak / null  passwords 
The above list can be sub-divided into two main categories of botnet propagation: 
 Automated infection ( no need for user interaction) 
 Infection requiring user interaction 
A report done by Palo Aton Networks [18] shows that bots take advantage of spreaders as 
it is stated that 85% of the sampled originations (363) have at least one susceptible 
spreader (e.g. p2p program, msn messenger  ...etc.) . 
There are various methods of attack that can be used to distribute a particular bot.  The 
most common three main methods of bot propagation as discussed in [19] are: 
1) Web Download: A recent google study showed that web-based infection vectors are now 
commonplace [20]. Web-based malware creates botnet-like structures in which 
compromised machines query web servers periodically for instructions and updates. 
2) Mail Attachments: E-mail attachments with mass mailing worms can contain bots. Spam 
techniques simplify and enable fast spreading of bots easily. 
3) Automatically Scan, Exploit and Compromise: The bots automatically infect hosts that 
have vulnerabilities. Figure 2.2 shows the various stages in a typical botnet life-cycle as 
summarised in [21]. Botnets usually recruit new victims by remotely exploiting a 
vulnerability of the victim’s machine. When the infection has been achieved, the victim 
executes a script and downloads bot binary from some location. The bot binary installs 
itself to the victim and automatically runs.  
2.4 Botnet Life Cycle: 
Botnet masters are always cautious and like to maintain their network of compromised 
computers. In order to do so, the bots must go through a life cycle. Usually the life cycle 
starts with the birth of the new Bot and the creation of the command and control server. 
The botnet is created by addition of other compromised nodes which are infected using 
one of the propagation techniques. Once the target computer has been compromised, the 
bot communicates with the command and control centre to report that it is live and ready 
to receive commands. At this stage, the botmaster tests the bot and updates the code if 
needed. The next activity depends upon the objective of the created bot. The botmaster 
can either advertise in the underground channels looking for customers willing to pay to 
use his botnet or use it for his own gain. 
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  Figure 2.2 Botnets lifecycle [22] 
The step “3” is optional since sometimes the attacked machine is provided with a list of IP 
addresses to get in touch with. The figure shows the infection process of a new bot. How a 
vulnerable machine is infected and taken over. 
 
  Figure 2.3 Botnet lifecycle [20] 
  Figure 2.3 above shows the botnet lifecycle from a bigger prospective 
including the different uses of the bot once infected. Once the victim computer gets 
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infected with the bot, it will either steals something such as credentials, information, credit 
card etc. or becomes part of a botnet. It is then ready to perform instructed tasks such as 
launch a DDOS attack, compromise other computers, host phishing website and send spam 
email. Basically it will do whatever the botmaster asks it to do.             
2.5 Botnets Topologies 
Botnets are usually categorized by their topology and architecture. The topology normally 
defines the protocols being used in bot communication and control [2, 23-25]. The different 
topologies are defined as: 
2.5.1 Centralised Topology 
The centralised topology is characterised by the presence of a central point of connection. 
This normally works as the command centre from which the botmaster controls the bots. 
The most common protocols used with this topology are IRC and HTTP [21].  This follows 
the basic structure of client- server network. The clients in this case are the compromised 
computers which are the bots.  The operation of the botnets that use this topology is 
described by the protocol used by that specific botnet. 
IRC botnets: 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), is regarded as the first protocol used in the creation of botnets. 
Once a bot managed to get into the client computer (using any mean of the propagation 
techniques) it tries to communicate with the pre-programmed command and control 
centre using the IRC protocol. The compromised system uses the default ports (tcp: 6667) 
to join the IRC channel to send information of the compromised system to the botmaster 
and wait for further instructions. This allows the botmaster to remotely control the 
infected machine and use it to conduct attacks or steal data. The main advantage of using 
IRC is that the IRC servers are free , available and easy to setup [26, 27]. Two of the known 
IRC-based botnet are the SDBot, Rxbot. 
 
   Chapter 2 
  10 
  
Botmaster
IRC Server
IRC Client
IRC ClientIRC Client
IRC Client
 
Figure 2.4 IRC bot architecture 
 
One of the most famous IRC bot is the RxBot. Rxbot, also known as rBot is written in C++ 
and has the functionality of spreading like a worm. It belongs to the Agobot family, targets 
Microsoft windows machines and uses IRC servers for command and control. It has the 
ability to support password protected IRC channels and has some powerful capabilities 
such as port scanning, packet sniffing and key logging. Rxbot can also utilise other protocols 
like SMTP client for sending spam and spreading and HTTP for click fraud and DDOS attacks. 
Rxbot [28] also has the ability for additional expansion modules such as capture, and 
cdkeys can add the functionality of capturing screen shots and images through webcam in 
addition to being able to steal certain information such as cd keys of different licensed 
software form the windows registry and user’s data.  
 
HTTP Botnet: 
In this type of botnets, the botmaster uses a web programming language such as PHP, 
JAVA, and ASP to build a web interface to be used as command and control centre. This 
web interface is used to send commands and receives responses. The bot is programmed 
to query the website in a certain way with a fixed interval time to check for new 
instructions. HTTP-based botnets uses the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol 
(port 80) to communicate with the command and control centre.  Once a computer gets 
infected, the bot contacts the web-based C&C and notifies it with its system’s information 
using HTTP [29]. This makes it harder for network administrators to block the 
communication channel as port 80 is an essential port for web browsing. Even worse, some 
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botnets use encrypted channels (HTTPS) to establish communications. Unlike the IRC bots, 
HTTP bots does not maintain the connection, but connect repeatedly at interval times. An 
example of this type of botnets is Zeus,Warbot and BlackEnergy [30].  
Here is closer look at Zeus: This type of botnets has become one of the most known and 
famous botnets in the cyber world. It has many capabilities and defences to avoid 
detection. It consists of 5 main components: 
1. The control panel: This control panel which consists a set of PHP scripts that 
provide a user interface page to control the bots and collect all the stolen 
information and store it in a MySQL database. 
2. Configuration files: these file are used to customize the botnet parameters. The 
configuration files are two: config.txt (this files holds the basic information) and the 
webinjects.txt (this identifies the targeted websites and the content inject rules. 
3. A generated encrypted config.bin file (encrypted version of the botnet 
parameters). 
4. A generated binary ( bot.exe) which is the infection file  
5. A builder program that generates the two files mentioned above. 
Since this is a HTTP type botnet, it uses pull methods to communicate and sync all bots. The 
communication pattern for Zeus is: 
1. The infected machine starts the communication by sending a GET request for the 
config.bin file from the command and control server. 
2. The command and control server replies with the encrypted config.bin file. 
3. The infected machine receives the config.bin file (which is encrypted) it decrypts it 
using the key embedded in the bot binary file. 
4. The infected machine defines its public IP address by connecting to a server and 
the server in return sends back the public IP address of the bot. 
5. The bot then reports to the command and control server with the stolen 
information and IP address using the POST command. 
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Figure 2.5 Zeus bot infection process 
 
The Zeus bot has many functionalities; it is capable of logging user inputs, capture and alter 
data, steal banking data. It is also capable of updating itself, uninstalling itself, creating a 
local copy and storing it in the machine for further activities. As a defensive precautions it 
will check if any firewall is installed, it changes some random bytes to avoid being detected 
by IDS, and duplicates modification, access and creation times of the ntdll.dll library to hide 
itself. 
Although this bot has been called the “the king of bots” it lacks a worm-like propagation 
feature. It basically focuses on spam and social engineering for the propagation. 
Black Energy: 
Black Energy botnet is a pure HTTP botnet; it has been modified several times due it is 
availability to the public [30]. This bot has several main functions likes its ability to hide 
itself form antivirus software, infect system processes and offer a range of malicious 
activates on the host.  It is primarily used for DDOS attacks. One of the main features of this 
bot is its ability to target more than one IP address per hostname. This is designed for 
hostnames that use DNS load balancing and to ensure that the botnet hits all target hosts. 
It is built on PHP and uses MySQL and can serve as socks proxy and/or http proxy. The bot 
herders usually take advantage of compromised Linux or BSD server which they set up as 
the command and control centres for this bot.  
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2.5.2 Peer to Peer Topology 
A Peer to Peer network is defined as a distributed network in which any node can act as 
both a client and a server at the same time [31]. Peer to peer botnets have the same 
common functions as other types of botnets but only differs in the way that the bot 
receives commands and sends results. In the peer-to-peer botnets, the command and 
control architecture is designed differently. Each node always signals out for the nearest 
node that it can communicate with. 
Spammer/
worker
Spammer/
worker
Repeater
 
Figure 2.6 Peer 2 Peer architecture 
 
This topology is a form of decentralised network introduced by botnet authors to 
circumvent the vulnerability of the centralised topology. Unlike in the Centralised topology, 
the nodes in the peer-to-peer network act as both clients and servers. Even if one node is 
taken down, the network stays operational under the control of botmaster [32].This design 
means that there is no single point of failure for the botnet . This feature of this 
architecture makes it harder to locate and shutdown the whole botnet. Phatbot [33], Sinit 
[34], Storm [35, 36] and Waledac [37, 38] are some of the botnets which implement this 
topology.  
The infection procedure of the P2P botnet is defined by the term bootstrapping. 
Bootstrapping is started when a bot needs to join the bot network [39]. The malware form 
used to compromise the computer has a list of bootstrap servers which the bot can contact 
when it is first run on the infected machine. The bootstrap server had a big list of IP 
addresses of other infected nodes and it provides the newly infected node with a small list 
of the nearest available nodes. The bot scans the availability of a public IP address assigned 
to the infected node. If the node has a public IP address, the node will be assigned to be a 
repeater/ server in the botnet since it can receive and send communication. Otherwise, 
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that is; if it has a private IP address and is behind a firewall/NAT/proxy, the node is assigned 
to be a spammer/worker for the botnet. This is done based on the assumption that this 
infected computer will not be accessible via the TCP port 80, which is used for the 
command and control.  
Once the bot is connected to the network, the botmaster needs a way of controlling the 
network. This is done through digital signing. Each bot has the public encryption key that is 
used to decrypt commands from the bot master which were encrypted using a 
corresponding private key. This ensures that only the botmaster can command the bots 
and that only the bots can read the command sent and also ensures that his bots are not 
hijacked by other hackers or security researchers. Since the structure of this topology 
makes it hard for the botmaster to control all the nodes, the nodes pass the commands 
along to other nodes by either connecting one to one or one to many. 
Here is a closer look at Popular P2P Botnets (Storm and Waledec): 
Storm: 
In 2007, Storm made its presence known on the internet due to the significant growth rate 
and its ability to distribute large spam and avoid detection. Storm is one of the first bots 
that uses P2P channel control to utilize fast flux [40]. The following factors illustrate the 
effectiveness of Storm bot: 
 It uses smart social engineering; the spam campaign generated by the storm bot is 
constantly changing and the infection links that are sent in the email always have 
interesting topics or themes such as recent weather disasters.  
 It has the ability to propagate using client-side vulnerabilities: all it needs is clicking 
on the URL link to infect the computer. 
 It can hijack a chat session and add a malicious URL to add more victims. 
 An effectively obfuscated command and control centre protocol over the 
overnet/edonkey protocol (p2p network) 
 Actively updating the spam bot client to adapt to the latest operating systems and 
security patches. 
The storm bot has many functionalities although its main objective is to send spam. These 
are; it exchanges free SMTP server, updates bots, updates spam templates, looks for and 
collect email addresses, scans drives of the infected machine to examine file content and 
collects data. The files usually collected are documents type files. The storm bot has a 
number of defence techniques; it can detected debuggers (used to study the bot), detect 
virtual environment (virtual machines), detect malware removal software. It is also known 
that this botnet attacks whoever tries to reverse engineer it or publish results about it. 
Waledac: 
The Microsoft Security Intelligence Report [41] states that they have been studying the 
Win32/Waledac malware for a number of years because of its technical complexity.   
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Waledac uses a robust communication method with both P2P and HTTP. Although Waledac 
is considered as a pure peer to peer network it utilises a backend-server. Once a computer 
gets infected with the Waledac malware, it is classified as: 
1- Spammer node   
If the infected computer doesn’t have a public IP address, it will assume that it is behind a 
NAT and will automatically make it a spammer node. This is done based on the assumption 
that this infected computer will not be accessible via the TCP 80, which is used for the 
command and control.  
2- Repeater node 
On the other hand, if the infected machine has a public IP and accessible port 80, it 
becomes part of the repeater tier and is added to the DNS infrastructure. The repeater tier 
is made up of the bulk of computers using P2P infrastructure for communication and each 
repeater node maintains a valid peering list. When a repeater node is online for a certain 
time, it will be registered in the DNS as an authoritative NS for the registered domains and 
it will be used for the command and control of the botnet.  
Repeaters and spammers continuously exchange lists of currently active repeaters. This 
ensures that once a spammer lost communication with one of the repeaters due it was 
taken off, it tries to communicate with the next repeaters and update the lists. Repeaters 
also exchange lists of currently active backend servers. The list is signed with a private key 
of the botnet master so no other attacker can insert his backend servers and take over the 
botnet. 
The Waledac botnet does not scan for vulnerability in order to propagate. It instead 
focuses on social engineering by using always instructing its Spammers to send emails with 
links pointing to the Waledac. To increase the percentage of the success of social 
engineering, spam emails are usually masked with some attractive emails such as greeting, 
news, etc. 
The infection cycle of the Waledac is as below: 
   Chapter 2 
  16 
  
 
Figure 2.7 Waledac Infection cycle 
 
Like most botnets, Waledac has many capabilities/objectives which are:  
 Sends spam emails and really HTTP requests. 
 Acts as fast-flux agents.  
 Steal credentials and or Data  
 Updates the infected bots with the new binary.  
 
2.5.3 Randomised Topology 
Under this topology, there is no defined structure. The botmaster scans the internet and 
just sends out the encrypted message while the bots will only listen for commands without 
contacting other nodes or the botmaster. Any number of protocols are employed under 
this structure. This topology has many disadvantages which include: 
 The difficulty of locating infected nodes because some nodes maybe located 
behind a firewall and not have a public IP address.  
 The ground physical networks on which the infected nodes are located could be 
mismatched causing a delay in scanning and locating the bots. 
 The degree of node operation given that there is no defined hierarchy might not be 
different which could cause a bottleneck in the bot network.  
 Node location requires flooding distributed to the command which leads to 
generation of many redundant messages [42].  
 
The following table summarizes botnets topologies. 
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Topology Architecture 
Centralised Client-server Architecture 
Peer to Peer Each node acts as a client and server at the 
same time. 
Randomised No defined structure 
Table 2.1 Topolgies of botnets 
 
 
 
2.6 Evolution of botnets 
For the last two decades, Botnets have been very challenging to defeat because of 
creativity of the botnet masters in trying to evade detection. Their propagation and 
detection evasive techniques kept getting more complex over time. In 1993, EggDrop, the 
first bot was used to manage chat sessions in IRC channels [19]. The communication 
features of this bot were then replicated for the first malicious botnet attack on IRC by 
implementing Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). This first 
evolution was realised in 1998 [19, 43] with the development of Global Threat bot - GTbot. 
This botnet changed the known characteristics of the bot because it was based on mIRC 
propagated and accessed the hosts through TCP and UDP socks while still responding to IRC 
events [44] and run custom scripts. 2002 saw the birth of commercialisation and staged 
attacks by botnets, where C++ written botnet SDbot was sold by its creator [6, 43]. Agobot  
defined the three stages of turning a host into a botclient [6];  
1- Create back door in the system.  
2- Disable antivirus software.  
3- Block access to security vendor websites.  
The two famous botnets which surfaced in 2003; Rbot, and Spybot [19, 43, 44] introduced 
additional functionalities such as key logging, data mining and sent out spammed instant 
messages away of propagating. They utilised remote access tools [45] which already 
included the key logging and connection forwarding functionalities to exploit the 
weaknesses in the Microsoft Remote Procedure call processes[46]. This changed the known 
propagation techniques of the botnets from random scanning to hit lists like email lists, 
buddy lists in AIM, etc. RBot [44] introduced compression and encryption to evade 
detection. The success of Rbot led to arbitrary modification of instruction sets, 
polymorphism and metamorphism introduced to avoid detection [19, 43].  
 In early 2004, Agobot was taken down using code analysis and reverse engineering by 
Microsoft and law enforcement authorities [5]. The reaction to this takedown from SDbot 
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saw a high rise of new variants, botnets attacking the antivirus and firewalls directly and 
migration to other communication protocols like HTTP (80) and P2P [5, 6, 46]. P2P was 
used to change the known architecture of botnets from centralised server to the botnets 
connecting to each other based on the botnet lists they have stored [19, 46-48]. HTTP is an 
essential protocol for Internet browsing and is also used for upload and download of binary 
data files which made it very viable and the idea of blocking this port is out of question in 
any network. Botmasters took over legitimate HTTP web servers to propagate their 
malicious code, by using a technique called a drive throw download. The idea behind this 
type of attack was to hack a legitimate website, alter all the URLs links for all the files to a 
different webserver that distributes the malware of choice. In some cases the targeted 
website was used as optional command and control servers. Botmasters registered and 
owned Domain Names that are similar to well-known websites to take advantage of an 
innocent typo mistake by users in the web browser for example, goggle.com for 
google.com. Other techniques include using “fast flux”  where one fully qualified domain 
name is allocated to different IP addresses  to trick the users into opening these malicious 
sites [47, 49-51]. HTTP based Zeus released in 2005 was mainly used for data stealing. By 
2007, Zeus was used by main cyber criminals to steal millions out of bank accounts [44]. It 
had a user interface and when new versions were released, older versions were released to 
the public for free. This meant that it didn’t require high technical skill or cost a lot to set 
up a botnet centre. 
Botnet crackdown was started because of the high number of cybercriminals that used 
botnets. Cybercriminals used hard to defeat botnets defined by hybrid architecture and 
customised communication protocols e.g.  Conficker, Waledec, variants of Zeus, MegaD, 
Storm, SpyEye, and Mariposa. An example is the takedown of McColo which housed 
MegaD, late 2008, Mariposa, Waledec and Zeus in 2010 [52, 53]. Zeus source code leaked 
in 2011 [43] which resulted into a high number of Zeus variant used in criminal activities. 
When Web 2.0 services like Google app, Facebook and twitter became a norm for many 
enterprises, botnets found new C&C surrogate and file storage servers for example Amazon 
Elastic compute cloud (EC2) was used for Zeus configuration files storage in 2009 [44, 54, 
55].  
Successful social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook were manipulated from late 
2008 to steal user information and the sites were used for storage and bandwidth for the 
C&C capabilities [56]. These botnets were difficult to track because they constantly 
changed their characteristics for example, KOOBFACE, one of the most popular botnets 
using Facebook, Twitter and MySpace changed the architecture, its binary components 
constantly and had different updates. It’s worth mentioning that these social networks 
have faced a challenge were they are used as a command and control centre. In 2009 it was 
found that some infected machines are following  twitter account feeds under the handle 
name “upd4t3” [57]  through the use of RSS. The takedown of KOOBFACE in 2012 [58] gave 
the web 2.0 services some relief and botnet writers are now conquering the smartphone. 
Recent studies show a presence of malware with botnet characteristics in the 
Smartphones. For example, DroidDream and DriodRAT in android OS and Fakeplayer sent 
multimedia message using SMS for C&C that charge the phone user a lot of money[59, 60]. 
Zeus in the mobile (ZitMo) has been noted to be used in mobile banking to capture user 
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information and to intercept the 2 way authorisation method introduced by banks to 
mitigate theft [59]. Given that protection of phones against cyber-attacks is a low priority, 
botnets are expected to take advantage of the advancements in mobile / smart-phones. In 
2014, more than $US200,000  worth of Bitcoins has been stolen by Pony botnet which is 
targeting crypto-currencies [61]. 
 
Year Changes Botnets 
1993 1St unmalicious bot developed for IRC channel 
management 
Eggdrop 
1998 IRC malicious use of DoS attacks. 
Access Raw TCP and UDP sockets 
Run custom scripts 
GTBot 
2002 Commercialisation of Botnets 
C++ built program. 
Very robust and sophisticated programming. 
Sequential delivery of attack payload. Remote 
vulnerability scan enabled 
1st P2P architecture adopted 
Centralised to Distributed C&C topology 
SDBot 
Agobot 
2003 Keylogging and connection forwarding. Data 
mining, Change of hit lists from random scanning 
to target lists Compression and encryption to avoid 
detection 
Spybot 
Sinit 
Rbot 
Slammer 
 
2004 Metamorphism and Polymorphism. Mass-mailing. 
DNS tunnelling, typo-squatting and Domain flux 
Polybot 
Bobax 
2005 More P2P botnets surfaced. 
Variants of SDBot very prominent. 
Changing the DNS host settings 
Mytob 
2006 First HTTP botnet. Function targeted like stealing 
bank details. Botnet published updates Successful 
P2P botnets 
1st Web service based botnets 
Rustock 
Zeus 
2007 Security vendor targeted attacks 
High processing power in botnets 
Ability to send large number of spam out per day. 
IP fast flux enabled 
Storm 
Cutwail 
Srizibi 
2008 SQL injections in legitimate sites. 
Hybrid topology adopted to avoid detection. 1st 
Social network site based botnets 
 
Conficker, Waledac, 
Mega-D 
Koobface 
Mariposa 
2010 1st fully DNS based botnets 
Customised encrypted communication protocols. 
TDL3,4,  
2011 Zeus source code leaks leading to many variants. SpyEye,Zeus variants, 
   Chapter 2 
  20 
  
Table 2.2 Botnet Timeline [5, 6, 19, 43, 44, 46, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62-64] 
 
 
2.7 Effects of Botnets 
Over the years, botnets have greatly affected government, company and personal 
networks and are estimated to cost the world $338 billion annually through Data theft, 
DDOS attacks, Spamming, adware, phishing, spyware, usage of network resources and Click 
fraud [65, 66]. The botmaster can also use the infected machine as an HTTP proxy, port 
redirection, socks proxy...etc. to evade detection by trace back [67]. The main effects of 
botnets are further defined and explained below: 
2.7.1 Data Theft: 
It’s a common practise to store highly sensitive personal information on computers 
or computer networks. Due to the huge volume of data handled by companies and 
the growth of computer processing power, companies now rely on network storage 
in order to have all the relevant information at their fingertips. The same applies to 
government organisations which have interconnected databases to manage public 
records. This pool of highly sensitive information can be used by different people for 
different reasons for example banking information can be used by thieves to steal 
money from bank accounts. A botnet that has access to this information gives the 
bot master a revenue source since this information can be stolen and sold to other 
interested parties. In 2009, researchers discovered that the Torpig botnet infected 
Mobile/ SMS based botnet in phones. Zeus in mobile (ZitMo), 
Fakeplayer 
2012 Smartphone botnets using social networking and 
attacking phone operating systems. 
 
DroidDream, Cawitt, 
SpamSold, 
ZitMo, SitMo 
2013 Increased use of P2P and use of malicious URLs for 
malware propagation. 
Botnet Bitcoin mining, Brute force attacks using 
more than 90,000 IP address as seen in the attack 
on WordPress sites.  
First known abuse of Yahoo ads to propagate 
malware. 
Dorkbot,Zeus Variants 
2014 The creation and design of botnet crafted to steal 
crypto-currencies. 
Pony Botnet 
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more than 182,000 [6] new systems and collected about 70GB of data which 
included thousands of bank account credentials belonging to hundreds of financial 
institutions in a period of 10 days [2]. This botnet used the interception of the web 
browser, acting like a local proxy to intercept the webpages and inject additional 
fields thus tricking the user into revealing more sensitive data (Figure 2.8). This 
same technique has also been used by various botnets for example Zeus in data 
theft. Other techniques employed include the capturing of the virtual keyboard that 
some banking institutions use to evade key logging (Figure 2.9).   
 
Figure 2.8 An example of web injecting used by botnets to steal banking information  [68] 
 
Apart from banking information theft which has been very popular because of the 
monetary terms related, botnets are also known to steal contacts, emails, Microsoft 
product keys [69] and identity information like date of birth, social security numbers 
and background information. 
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Figure 2.9 Capturing of virtual keyboard [68] 
2.7.2 DDOS attacks 
The first malicious attack performed by botnets was the Denial of Service and so it has 
been a defining feature of many botnets. This feature has now evolved to Distributed 
Denial of Service attack [69]. In this attack bots are instructed to send a large size of UDP 
packets or ICMP requests to flood and deplete the network bandwidth and the system 
resources of the target system or network. These type has grown from the initial days 
where the first botnet in 1998 performed a denial of service using IRC protocol to date 
where DDOS attacks are used to cripple company operation using various protocols. In 
2013, Prolexic Technologies, a globe leader in DDOS protection services announced that 
the average attack recorded in the 1st quarter of 2013 was 48.25Gbps, an increase of 718% 
over the last quarter of 2012 [70]. 
In 2014, the internet recorded the largest DDOS attack of all time. This attack was aimed at 
a French DDOS protection service company called CloudFlare and is considered the largest 
attack because it got to a rate of 400Gbps [71].  The idea behind this type of attack is to 
have the botnets use a technique called a reflection attack. A large number of botnet take 
advantage of a flaw in the Network Time Protocol (NTP) and query for list of other NTP 
servers. Having substituted the source IP of the packet sent from the botnet to the IP 
address of the target machine,  the NTP server will reply back with the answer to the Target 
IP resulting. If this query is sent to many NTP servers, the target machine will experience  a 
DDoS the target IP [72]. Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 illustrates the difference between a 
normal DDoS attack and A DRDoS (reflection) attack. 
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Figure 2.10 Normal DDoS attack [73] 
 
 
Figure 2.11 DRDoS (Reflection) attack [73] 
2.7.3 Spamming 
Botnets are known to be used for spamming which can be viewed as a propagation 
technique. Some of the botnets known to use spam are Srizi and Storm. In 2008, it was 
reported that about 153 billion spam emails were sent out every day of which about 91 
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million were botnet generated [6]. By the end of 2010, it is estimated that the total spam 
sent from botnets represents 77% of all spam [74]. Table 2.3 shows the percentage of each 
bot responsible of sending spam.  
 
Table 2.3 Botnets and Spam [74] 
A recent report by Symantec, states that the spam rates declined from 75 percent in 2011 
to 69 percent of all email in 2012. A global spam volume per day in 2012 is represent Figure 
2.12  below: 
 
   Chapter 2 
  25 
  
Figure 2.12 Global spam volume in billons for 2012 [75]. 
 
The above figure shows the estimated projection of global spam volumes that decreased by 
29 percent, from 42 billion spam emails per day in 2011 to 30 billion spam email in 2012 
[75]. 
2.7.4 Spyware, Adware and Malware 
Some botnets have spyware installed on the compromised machine which monitor the 
activity of the user without their consent and sell this information for profit. Some spyware 
collect keystrokes and information that is known to be of value to sell to interested parties. 
Adware uses the report of web user activity to download, install and display product 
advertisements that it deems the user could be interested in based on the internet use 
history. It is also known to install plugin in the web browser that force it to visit certain 
websites without the consent of the user. 
Malware is installed on the machine to compromise it in order to affect its operations. The 
malware can be used to perform various activity by the bot master. 
2.7.5 Phishing 
Botnets are used to scan and identify vulnerable servers that can be taken over by bot 
masters and then used to host phishing sites. These sites impersonate legitimate services in 
order to steal passwords and sensitive information.  In most botnets, spamming is used to 
serve phishing attacks. 
2.7.6 Usage of network resources 
Since network resources cost a lot of money, most bot herders siphon the resources 
they need for their operation from the systems they infect or take over. These 
resources which include processing power, storage space, bandwidth to mention 
but a few can be used for different purposes:  
1. Cyber-attacks for example DDoS attacks 
2. Spam Generators. 
3. Malware Distributors. 
4. Storage Space: The compromised machines in a botnet can be used to store the 
data collected by the bot master. For example Amazon Elastic compute cloud (EC2) 
was used to store Zeus configuration files in 2009 [44, 54, 55] and Twitter and 
Facebook were used for storage and bandwidth for the Command and Control 
capabilities in late 2008 [56]. 
5. Bitcoin mining. 
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6. Rent: Botmasters rent use of the botnet to other users which is quite a lucrative 
activity as they can earn up to about $190,000 [7] in a day renting out the acquired 
network resources. 
2.7.7 Click Fraud 
Click fraud is the action that happens when a user visits an online advertisement where this 
advertisement is charged to the sponsor on the basis of number of clicks. The botnet once 
executed, performs automated clicks to send for web requests thus generating a lot of 
revenue an example is google AdWords.  [13, 14, 76]. 
2.8 Existing solutions 
There has been a lot of interest in finding solutions against botnet. This section discusses 
some of the popular techniques used to fight botnet and these detection methods are 
classified as: 
2.8.1 Passive Techniques 
Packet inspection: This is basically matching different protocol fields or payloads of a 
packet against a predefined suspicious or abnormal content which is well implemented in 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). This method has some drawback since it uses signature 
based detection. These are;  
 High number of false positive as some legitimate packets maybe classified as malicious 
packets. 
 By dividing malicious code into different payloads, some packets may evade detection.  
 It is difficult to do a full packet inspection especially in a high traffic networks.  
 Malicious encrypted packets cannot be detected.  This technique has been used in an 
anomaly-based detection approach [77] that uses an algorithm to detect IRC based 
botnets  and “BotHunter” [10] where both inbound and outbound packets were 
observed and dialogue-based correlations were executed to detect infections. Snort, 
enhanced and customised rules and two malware related plugin were used.  
Domain name server (DNS) traffic analysis: Botnet simultaneously start to query for a new 
command and control server once their initial C&C has failed or was taken offline (group 
activity), These queries can be collected and observed as was done in  the  anomaly-based 
detection approach for Command and control centres presented  in[78] which focuses on 
the query behaviour of bots.  
Analysis of spam records: During SPAM campaigns, a number of infected machines send 
spam emails having the same pattern. The presence of infected machines is indicated by 
the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) generating a considerably higher number of DNS 
traffic than usual. The work in [79] demonstrated that the analysis of large amounts of 
spam can be used successfully to map spam bot. 
Honeypots: It is an intentionally vulnerable resource that is deployed inside a network with 
the objective of soliciting attack or being compromised by a malicious entity. It is bound to 
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discover new information about the practices and strategies used by the malwares. The 
knowledge can then be used to measure the attacks coming from botnets which would 
then enable the network administrators identify the infected machines. Honeypots are 
generally used to gather information about bots [27]. 
2.8.2 Active Techniques:  
The active measurement techniques are the approaches that involve interaction with the 
information sources that are being monitored.  
Sinkholing: This is a counter measure used for cutting off the bot or “zombie machines” 
from the botnet’s command and control centre. Traditionally bots use a domain name to 
contact the command and control centre, this domain name is resolved by DNS query. 
Since Domain Name service (DNS) is a core service used to access the internet, it can be 
used to intercept the communications between the bots and C&C. This is known as DNS 
Sinkholing. DNS sinkhole is spoofing the authoritative DNS server for malicious and 
unwanted hosts and domains and returning a false IP address for these known command 
and control centres.  
Botmaster
Target Local Server
10.0.0.10
Bot’s C&C
118.120.10.5
DNS Server
Returned
118.120.10.5
DNS Query
Botmaster
Target
Bot’s C&C
DNS Sinkhole
Returned
IP 10.0.0.10
DNS Query
 
Figure 2.13 Sinkhole architecture 
Reverse engineering: This is a technique used to reveal the functionality of the compiled 
program. It can be used to extract the information about the installation process of a bot 
and what technique it uses to propagate and communicate with the command and control 
centre. By using this approach researchers can develop counter measures from the 
information that is extracted such as detection signatures to be used with IDSs for example. 
There are two types of reverse engineering of a botnet i.e. Static, and Dynamic. The static 
reverse engineering is done without the actual execution of the binary file. While in 
dynamic the binary file is executed in a controlled environment. 
It’s worth mentioning that these “active techniques” can backfire because the 
implementation of any active techniques may notify the botmaster of such action which 
may result in the attack of the system that implemented this technique. Usually the attack 
will be a DDoS attack or misuse of any critical information or data stolen from the 
comprised systems, or simply updating the bot to evade these monitoring techniques.  
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2.8.3 Other Counter Measures: 
There are also some other initiatives and counter measurements to fight botnets not 
classified in the detection techniques. Most of these initiatives focus on the command and 
control infrastructure of a botnet.  
Blacklisting: Some recent approaches work with what is called real-time blacklists; these 
blacklists contain IP addresses that have been identified as infected machines. Different 
institutions defend against botnet infection by blocking all the machines on the blacklist. 
These blacklists are available as a service open for subscription with lists updated regularly.  
Distribution of “fake - traceable” credentials: The most common botnet objective is 
stealing personal information and data, which is then dropped in the open zone for sale by 
the botmaster.  This method of detection uses this effect of botnets against them by adding 
fake traceable information in the system. The objective of this fake information is to 
contaminate the data stole/harvested by the bot in order to reduce the profitability of the 
entire botnet and create mistrust between the buyer and the botmaster. The crafted 
credentials can also be used to track the parties involved in the process by tracing their 
movement pattern. However, most banks are not willing to cooperate especially when it 
cross-border level, as even its fake account have to be filled with real money for a 
transactions to take place. 
BGP Blackholing (Border Gateway Protocol): This protocol is widely used in the internet 
and consequently becoming the predominant technology for routing decisions. BGP is used 
to maintain the internet routing table which includes information between autonomous 
systems and the shortest path. Data provided by the blacklisting techniques mentioned 
previously can be used to change the routing polices and dropping malicious host to deny 
traffic to and from them and their network. These routing decisions are made at ISP level 
and affect hosts served by that ISP. The BGP blackholing is suitable for use against botnet 
that have a static command and control centre. This will result into saliently dropping and 
no routing communication between bots and their command and control server. 
Direct takedown of command and control server: The initial step used to in this approach 
is to identify the command and control IP addresses. After identifying the IP address of the 
command and control centre, the service provider is then identified. Once this is done a 
request for takedown that server is initiated. This can be very challenging as the service 
provider may not be cooperative or, in some countries, the hosting provider is not allowed 
to cease the operation by law. A takedown request depends mainly on the country’s law 
and the terms and conditions of the service provider.  
Blocking port 25 by ISPs: This is a preventive measure applied by ISPs to cut down the 
amount of spam mails using their network. This approach is based on the idea that 
bots/spammers will use open relay mail servers or mail exchange server via port 25 to 
distribute spam. 
The “Sybil Attack” for P2P: This defence approach is aimed at manipulating the routing in 
peer-to-peer networks by adding a large number of crafted and independent peers that are 
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controlled from a central component. The Sybils will continually advertise themselves to 
existing real bots participating in the peer-to-peer network. The bots will answer any route 
requests with their identifiers and this way, the routing tables in the bots will be 
“poisoned” over time by Sybils. 
Other non-technical approaches exist such as raising user awareness, Central incident help 
desk to provide consultation on the treatment of bot infections, and dedicated laws on 
cybercrime.  
2.9 The Enterprise Network 
An enterprise network can be defined as the enterprise's communications spine which 
connects nodes across departments, facilitating resource and data accessibility to end users 
and devices spread over a single geographic location. It can span a single floor, building or a 
group of buildings spread over an extended geographic area. An enterprise network 
reduces communication protocols, facilitating system and device interoperability, as well as 
improve internal and external enterprise data management. An enterprise network 
computer that functions within a domain has either of the two roles: members or domain 
controllers (DC).  
A domain controller is defined by Microsoft as a server the responds to security 
authentication requests (logging in, checking permission, etc.) within the windows server 
domain and host access to the domain resources. The domain controllers (DC) is the 
network centrepiece of the Active Directory (AD) [80] which is basically directory service 
that stores user account information, authenticates users and enforces security policy for 
the enterprise domain. 
A domain member is any computer part of the domain. It uses authentication to gain 
access to the domain [81] resources. 
2.9.1 DHCP Server 
DHCP stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. It is a client/server protocol 
that provides network nodes with an Internet Protocol (IP) and other related 
configuration information such as the subnet mask and default gateway. DHCP is 
defined by RFCs 2131 and 2132 [82].DHCP server allows network nodes to obtain 
necessary TCP/IP configuration information. It’s worth mentioning that All Windows-
based clients, network components such as network printers, NAS drives, network 
scanners, Mac OSX machines and Linux machines include the DHCP client as part 
of TCP/IP. Since every device on a network must have a unique IP address to 
access the network and its resources, it would be tedious and challenging for an IT 
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personal to do all the IP addresses configuration manually. DHCP offer many 
advantages such as minimal configuration errors caused by manual IP address 
configuration or address conflicts. It also reduces network administration due to the 
centralized and automated TCP/IP configuration management. 
2.9.2 DNS Server 
Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the main protocols that are part of TCP/IP. 
The DNS database contains records that map user-friendly alphanumeric names for 
network resources to the IP address used by those resources for communication. 
Human beings naturally find it easier to remember a string of words than a string of 
numbers. The DNS basically acts as a converter device to convert given letters to 
numbers or vice-versa, making network resources easier to remember for users. 
DNS is implemented using two software components: the DNS server and the DNS 
client. By default, DNS is used for all name resolution in a Windows Server 2008 
network. When a network user requests the name of a network host or an internet 
DNS domain name, the DNS Client service running the user computer contacts a 
DNS server to resolve the name to an IP address [83]. 
2.9.3 Active Directory 
Active Directory (AD) is a directory service employed by Microsoft for Windows 
domain networks which is included in most Windows Server operating systems. An 
AD domain controller authenticates and authorizes all users and computers in a 
Windows domain type network, assigning and imposing security policies for all 
workstations and updating/installing software. When a user logs into a workstation 
that is part of the domain, Active Directory checks the credentials and determines 
the network resources access level available to that specific user.  Active Directory 
makes use of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) versions 2 and 3, 
Microsoft's version of Kerberos [80]. The Active Directory service employs DNS as 
   Chapter 2 
  31 
  
its domain controller location mechanism. When any of the main Active Directory 
operations is performed, such as authentication, searching, or updating, network 
computers use DNS to locate Active Directory domain controllers and these domain 
controllers use DNS to locate each other. For example, when a network user with 
an Active Directory user account logs in to an Active Directory domain, the user’s 
computer uses DNS to locate a domain controller for the Active Directory domain to 
which the user wants to log in.  
 The frequently used objects in Active directory are users (Figure 2.14), computers (Figure 
2.15), and groups. These objects can be organized into organizational units (OUs) by any 
number of logical or business needs. Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can then be linked to OUs 
to centralize the settings for various users or computers across an organization. In this 
work, the default GPO is used with minor adjustments such as having the self-healing 
service ran on workstations and setting ‘Self-healing Clean Image’ folder to “read only”. 
 
Figure 2.14 Active Directory - Users 
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Figure 2.15 Active Directory - Computers 
The enterprise network is a standard network design for almost all companies and 
organisation which means that this network has the biggest source of data and network 
resources. This makes them very big targets for botnet attacks. With the inclusion of 
corporate espionage, companies can face DDOS attacks from their competition. The 
economic damage related to attacks on enterprise settings can be very astounding. This 
makes the focus on defending an enterprise setting against botnet attacks is very 
important. Given that enterprise networks are actually controlled and monitored networks, 
the application of a self-healing system in order to defend the systems from botnet attacks 
is achievable.  
2.10  Self-healing: 
A self-healing implementation enables a system to recognize that it is not operating 
correctly and with no or minimal human intervention, restores the system to its normal 
working state or maintains the system in a working condition until human intervention 
[84].  This section will cover the definition of the self-healing system along with the various 
approaches that researchers have been applying in self-healing systems.  
Since self-healing systems can be regarded as very general and similar to what is expected 
of fault-tolerant / survivable systems, it is worth mentioning that fault tolerant systems 
include stabilization techniques and replication techniques. Some studies, address self-
healing systems as a subordinate to fault-tolerant systems. Self-healing systems focus on 
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methods for stabilizing, replacing, securing, isolating and strategies to repair and prevent 
faults. Self-healing applications’ operation are processes of isolating a faulty component, 
taking it off line, fixing the failed component and/or reintroducing a replacement/fixed 
component [85]. 
2.10.1 Back ground of Self-healing mechanism  
The concept of self-healing originates from a paradigm of nature. This biological system is 
imbedded within nature, where it allows the biological systems to adapt and heal to 
changing environments. Self-healing is well defined by how the human immune system 
works. The immune system is specifically designed to fend off any infection using the given 
body resources and has managed to defend against new and old diseases over an evolution 
of ages. As described in  [86] , this complex system has cells (lymphocytes) that constantly 
patrol the body to detect and kill off any unfamiliar cells. This requires them to be able to 
tell from the body cells and foreign cells.  
By analysis, the human immune system is self-organising, distributed and adaptive. It has 
the ability to detect, recognise and isolate foreign cells, decide whether to attack the 
antigen or adapt to the way the antigen works, store the resulting information for future 
use and kill off un-needed cells in the body.  
The role of nature in natural immune systems for protecting animals from viruses, bacteria 
and toxins is very similar to self-healing in the computer field [87].  
The self-healing systems are designed to enable the continuous availability of the 
resources. This system design’s main objectives are to ensure that a healthy system is 
always in operation and that it can survive any kind of attack. These objectives are achieved 
by attributes which are further defined by the applied processes. The self-healing solution 
works on the condition that it will always use defined policies to perform checks on the 
resources in the system it controls at intervals to ensure smooth operation and detect any 
anomalies.  It is also worth noting that although self-healing systems can be designed to be 
self-reliant, human intervention still remains a very important component.  
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Figure 2.16 Self-healing attributes 
2.10.2 Components of self-healing systems 
 The most critical components of the self-healing systems are the three stages the system 
must fulfil in order for it to be deemed functional. 
1) Maintenance of health. The system must ensure that only the healthy components 
of the system are in operation. In order to do this, it has to know the healthy state 
of the system. This works as a basis on which it compares every state of the system 
in order to detect anomalies. There are different strategies that have been applied 
to maintain the system health such as component [84]:  
a.  Redundancy: Replicated components of the system are designed into the 
systems to ensure that there is always a backup component of each stage 
of operation. This ensures that in case a components needs to be taken 
offline for repair, there is already an existing healthy resource that perform 
the same operation. This is the theory behind the backup systems. 
b.  System probing: During the operation, the system always probes for latest 
system information. This allows for monitoring of its health at all times and 
enables early detection.  
c. Assessing the system state:  Using the information gathered, the system 
performs different analysis based on the defined policies to assess the 
state of the system. Some of the information used can be performance logs 
of the system and event logs of the system. These logs provide the 
overview of the system how it is operating. 
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2) Detection of system failure. The detection of system failure deals with the ability of 
the system to detect failure or the presence of malicious agents. At this stage, the 
system must be able to assess the degree of malfunction and whether it actually 
needs a recovery or not.  If any module of a system is under attack, other modules, 
which remain unaltered, should continue to perform as before. Several approaches 
haven been applied to the detection of abnormalities in the functionality of 
systems. This can be summarized into: 
a. System monitoring models: Different design model can be implemented 
that use the defined policies and probe the system for updated information 
to be used by the solution in detecting the presence of anomalies. 
b. Dealing with missing components: This stage defines the system 
procedures to be taken if the solution detects a missing component in the 
system. Depending on the approach taken the system should be able to 
make-up for this missing component and continue operation. 
c. Identification of foreign elements: Using the information collected from the 
system and comparing it to the known healthy state, the system can 
detected the presence of a foreign element. This process defines how to 
handle this instance. 
3) System recovery. The system recovery from an unhealthy state to a healthy state 
requires the healing system to apply recovery policies for healing the anomaly in 
the system. This may consist of redundancy techniques such as replication of 
components to replace dead components [88].  
The objectives of a self-healing system is to maximize availability, survivability, 
maintainability and reliability [89]. 
2.10.3 Related Work on self-healing systems 
Self-healing has been addressed in other areas of research. These are some of the related 
works that have been explored during this study. 
One of the earliest known application of self-healing is its incorporation in the  operating 
systems self-healing where some techniques such as code reloading, component isolation 
and automatic restarts have been implemented [8].  
Self-healing has also been addressed in embedded systems where mapping between 
resources and tasks have been considered. This means that on a network of resources, 
more instances of the same tasks are running simultaneously, some of them as idle and on 
event of failure these idle tasks take over [90] which increases the reliability of the system.  
In [91], a self-healing framework to defend against internet worms is proposed where the 
systems monitors itself to detect any exploits, identifies its vulnerabilities, fixes them to 
become attack resistant and then recovers from the attack. While the work in [91] achieves 
very good results in detecting and recovering from worm attacks in systems, botnet attacks 
that mimic the user interaction can easily evade this system. The design called Sting works 
by monitoring only applications that are deemed untrusted by the system and focuses on 
attacks that take advantage of the system vulnerabilities. Botnets attacks don’t necessary 
take advantage of vulnerabilities and have other means of propagation. The work also 
focuses on the use of the vulnerabilities in system by worms to compromise the machine 
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without factoring the user as part of the system vulnerability. This thesis considers the fact 
that even the most secure system can be vulnerable with the introduction of the human 
factor. 
2.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the literature review that was covered during the study. It 
covers the background information on Botnets, Enterprise Networks and Self-healing 
systems required for the development of the designed framework. Botnets also defined as 
controlled malware are fully explored in this chapter, describing the topology, 
characteristics, evolution, effects of botnets and already existing defence techniques. It 
further introduces the enterprise network and self-healing system components and 
attributes. The background information detailed in this chapter works as the foundational 
building blocks used in the design stage of the study. 
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Chapter 3. Proposed Framework design  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the proposed self-healing architecture which aims to make the 
enterprise network resilient against any botnet infection. Since the scope of the proposed 
model is the Enterprise network, the system is designed to fit and work within the 
enterprise environment specifically. The proposed self-healing framework takes advantage 
of the characteristics of the domain network such as having the agents running as a service 
to perform the needed functions. It addresses network survivability and mitigates against 
any botnet infection. The proposed system is integral to  the "security in depth" concept as 
some IDS systems might not detect any issue in the network as they work using a signature 
based methods [92]. Some botnets mimic human behaviour in performing some tasks, a 
method that can evade signature based detection used in the IDS systems. Detailed below 
is the proposed design and the components that form the self-healing framework. 
3.2 Proposed Design 
The proposed framework is designed to work in an enterprise environment. The proposed 
design therefore takes advantage of the characteristics of the enterprise network to define 
the following settings which are crucial to efficiency of the framework: 
a) The initial network state is known as the clean state is always known to the 
enterprise network in a controlled environment. 
b) The workstation’s agent clean state is uniform for all the computers connected 
to the network.  
c) Traffic in and out of the network can be closely monitored.  
d) System back-ups are centrally done and therefore any trusted changes to the 
system are always known.  
e) Only the central authority i.e. the system administrator is allowed to make 
system affecting changes. 
The proposed self-healing framework consists of the following modules:  
 Detection Module: This is the module that captures and compares the system state 
“state1” against the clean state “state0”. If a system change is detected, it generates 
alerts that are used by the healing module. 
 Healing module: This module is responsible for reversing system changes detected by 
the previous module. If it encounters any errors, it generates a report and activates 
the controlling module otherwise; it generates a report for further analysis which is 
logged by the system. 
 Communication Module:  This module processes all the communication between the 
server and the agent components of the framework.  
 Controlling Module: This module is responsible for the isolation of the infected node 
from the enterprise network. It is activated by the healing module when the infection 
cannot be reversed. It changes the network card configuration to connect the 
infected node to a quarantined network thus taking it off main enterprise network 
“offline”. This is done to reduce the infection impact and to avoid further botnet 
propagation through the network. The takedown is performed by the agent service 
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after the instructions have been received from the system. A report logged and sent 
to the administrator asking for human intervention. 
 Reporting module: This is responsible for any output from the self-healing system. It 
ranges from logged report files to system alerts sent to the administrator. It is 
responsible for archiving reports and system log files for further analysis. It also has 
an archiving system for all the logs that have been recorded. This module has the 
ability to generate reports daily, weekly, and monthly. 
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Figure 3.1 Self-healing Architecture 
 
The proposed framework consists of two main parts; the self-healing server and the 
agent running service on the workstation. These two parts interact using different methods 
implemented under the different modules to perform the required operations.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the self-healing architecture with components. 
3.2.1 The self-healing server 
This is the component that keeps all the detailed information about the network self-
healing activities. It stores the configuration files and an image of the clean system state 
“state (0)” and is the point of contact for human monitoring. It communicates with the 
agent during the self-healing process with information required for each step and 
command. It is triggered by time intervals or manually to check for any alerts reported by 
the HIDS system and perform the healing tasks. “State 0” repositories contain all the 
trusted system files (an image of the system). This system image is taken at the set-up of 
the network and by the initial HIDS data which holds the SHA1 values of each file.  
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3.2.2 Agent running service 
This component runs as a domain service and it has all the modules stated previously 
(Detection module, Healing module, communication module, reporting module and 
control module). To ensure continued availability of the network services, this service 
runs in the background of the hosts in the network. It also runs in a continuous time wait 
loop monitoring the health of the system to ensure that the system can survive the 
effects of any attack. The interval time is set by the system administrator.  
Since the focus of this research is to heal rather than to detect, a Host based Intrusion 
Detection System is used as the Detection module. With an additional configuration and 
tweaking in order to meet the need for a successful detection of botnets. The additional 
configurations are to enable the HIDS system notice any changes in the state of the 
system files using SHA1 checks, any new files added in Windows OS and any additional 
values added or changed in the registry.  It monitors the integrity of the system. After 
studying various types of botnets and their operation, the knowledge of the actions taken 
by the controlled malware is used to define the configurations added in the HIDS for 
successful botnet activity detection. An overview of the event sequence is shown in 
Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 An overview of the event sequence module 
 
 
 
3.3 Functional requirements  
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In any designed system there are functional requirements and non-functional 
requirements. This section will list all the functional requirements of the proposed self-
healing framework to achieve its goal. Since the framework is consisted of different parts, 
the layout of this section is divided into different sections. 
1- The system is to be a part of the enterprise domain: utilize the access restrictions 
using the active directory 
2- Be able to resilience/control a botnet infection, in order to maintain the availability 
and integrity of the network. 
3- Self-healing server has the ability to: 
A. Understand the logs passed from the HIDS. 
B. Execute and perform functional SQL queries. 
C. Generate instructions based on each infected machine. 
D. Keep logs and archive. 
4- The Agent workstations must be able to: 
a) Capture the current state of the system (clean state). 
b) Detected any new files added to the OS directory. 
c) Monitor any changes (integrity checks) using SHA1/MD5 this include DNS host 
file. 
d) Send logs to the server. 
e) Run as a service in the background 
f) Be able to listen and get instructions from the self-healing server. 
g) Understand the instruction. 
h) Force remove any files instructed by the self-healing regardless of write 
protection or read-only parameters. 
i) Copy / over write any running process/files.  
j) Force close any running application ( as instructed) 
k) Access to the windows registry/modify/remove/add. 
l) Retrieve genuine files from the self-healing repository OS image. 
m) Take of the machine of the network or change the connected network by 
changing the network connection properties. 
n) Each agent must be able to identify itself in order to pick up the right 
instructions. 
3.4 Chapter summary 
The Chapter details the proposed design of the self-healing framework. It discussed the 
modules of the framework, detailing the operations of each module while defining their 
interaction structure. It also details the components of the design and how they are 
integrated into the known components of the enterprise networks. The sequence of 
operation of the proposed framework Figure 3.2 is designed to show how the modules are 
integrated into the components and how they interact with each other to efficiently ensure 
the resilience of the enterprise network against botnets and ensure the survivability and 
availability of the network components. The chapter defines how the framework takes 
advantage of the characteristics of the enterprise network to perform efficiently. It also 
provides the functional requirements of the framework defining what each components 
should be able to do for successful resilience of the enterprise network. 
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Chapter 4. Self-healing Framework Implementation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes in detail all the steps followed when building the proposed self-
healing framework. It details the algorithms used in each component of the framework. 
4.2 Self-healing Framework 
The proposed framework section consists of two main parts: server and agent and fives 
modules: detection, communication, healing, controlling and reporting as detailed Chapter 
3. The following paragraphs will cover in detail the implementation process followed to 
successfully build this frame work. This self-healing framework relies on the detection 
module to make informed decisions. The detection module was the first module built as all 
the other processes relied on its success. After successfully obtaining results for this 
module, the work was subdivided based on the components and this is how this work is 
presented in this chapter. 
4.2.1  Detection module 
Since this study set out with the aim of providing a self-healing system in a network 
enterprise, we take advantage of the detection systems already available and focus on 
accomplishing the healing and restoring part of the framework. For the purpose of this 
experiment OSSEC [93] Host based intrusion detection system is chosen. The reasons 
behind choosing OSSEC are: 
1. It is a free open source host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS). 
2. It provides integrity checking and windows registry monitoring [93].  
3. It works on cross platforms and can be centralized. 
4. It is scalable (client/server architecture). 
Although OSSEC is a powerful HIDS, It exhibits some challenges in relation to the 
requirements for this study which had to be overcome: 
1. OSSEC doesn’t effectively detect botnet infections in a machine therefore 
additional rules and decoders were written to have the HIDS generate alerts once 
the OS integrity is changed. 
2. While OSSEC has the ability to store the logs in a centralized location, the logs are 
stored in a syslog format. This format pauses a challenge to read without certain 
software. To overcome this, the logs were saved into a MySQL database and a 
code was written to analyse the logs before passing them to the self-healing 
system. 
 OSSEC is composed of multiple parts. It consists of a central manager which monitors and 
receives information from agents. The manager also stores the file integrity checks, logs 
events, rules/decoders and major configuration options. It also has the agent which is a 
small program installed on the systems that are monitored. The agent collects information 
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in real time and sends it to the manager for analysis. Figure 4.1 illustrates the detection 
process [94]. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 OSSEC detection process [94] 
 
The OSSEC agent/server communication is compressed (zlib) and encrypted using pre-
shared keys. The default port for communication is UDP 1514. 
OSSEC comes packed with rules, but additional rules had to be written to detect any 
changes to the system integrity and generate alerts that are used by the self-healing 
framework.   
<rule id = "111" level = "5"> 
 <decoded_as>sshd</decoded_as> 
 <description>Logging every decoded sshd 
message</description> 
      </rule> 
 
The above is an example of how rules are written (XML format) in OSSEC. Some changes 
were made to the local_rules.xml (located in the 
/var/ossec/rules/local_rules.xml) in order to have it detect and alerts on 
specific content added to the “system32” directory. Below are two of the examples needed 
to be applied to successfully detect botnet infection. 
<rule id="554" level="10" overwrite="yes"> 
  <category>ossec</category> 
  <decoded_as>syscheck_new_entry</decoded_as> 
  <description>File added to the system.</description> 
  <group>syscheck,</group> 
      </rule> 
 
The above code can be simplified as below 
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IF rule 554 is triggered { 
IF path is C:\windows\system32 { 
IF file is .exe { 
Send alert.} 
} 
}   
These rules can be changed by administrators if needed. 
The configuration file of the agents has also been altered to enable the system to monitor 
the windows OS directory.  The configuration below was added to agent’s configuration 
file. 
 
<alert_new_files>yes</alert_new_files> 
<directories check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/</directories> 
 
OSSEC Database: 
OSSEC HIDS does have the ability to send logs and alerts to the MySQL so population of a 
database can easily be managed. However, the version available for this study had the 
limitation whereas the design was ok, not all the data was sent to the right tables. This 
paused a challenge as the information was stored in the full log field rather than being 
divided and saved into the corresponding correct fields. This was noticed during the 
implementation and since it is important for the modules to extract and use the right 
information from the tables, the database structure was studied to identify the primary 
keys and the information stored in the different fields. Below is the structure of the OSSEC 
database: 
 
Alert
id
server_id
rule_id
timestamp
location_id
src_ip
dst_ip
src_port
dst_port
alertid
 
Used fields: 
All fields are propagated with data in this table. 
The primary key is the id. 
data
id
server_id
user
full_log
timestamp
 
Used fields: 
All fields are used except the user field. 
Primary key is : id  
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location
id
server_id
name
 
Used fields: 
All fields are used. 
Primary key is: id 
signature_category_mapping:
id
rule_id
cat_id
 
Used fields: 
All fields are used. 
Primary key is: id 
Agent
id
server_id
ip_address
version
name
 
Used fields: 
No data is stored in is table of this OSSEC version. This 
table is empty. 
Category
cat_id
cat_name
 
Used fields: 
All fields are used. 
Primary key is cat_id. 
server
id
last_contact
version
hostname
information
 
Used fields: 
All fields are used. 
Primary key is: id 
signature
id
rule_id
level
description
 
Used fields: 
All fields are used. 
Primary key is: id 
 
Figure 4.2 shows how the database tables relate to each other. Understanding this was 
crucial as the self-healing system relies on the information; alerts and logs saved in the 
database to identify the node that needs to be healed.  
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Figure 4.2 HIDS Tables Relations 
Some of the tables in the database are not used in this version of the database, instead the 
data is concatenated with other information and stored in a different field. Figure 4.3-4.5 
show how the data is stored in the MySQL database.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Data table in HIDS 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Alerts table in HIDS 
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Figure 4.5 Location Table in HIDS 
Initial tests were carried out to ensure that the HIDS was configured and was working in the 
required way. These tests were done before connecting the HIDS to the next module in the 
self- healing framework. These checks were performed by adding new files (known files 
names) in to the windows OS, modifying some files of the system OS and adding some 
values in the registry keys and then checking the HIDS to ensure that it captured these 
known changes. After a few trail and errors, configuration changes and more checks, the 
OSSEC was working perfectly and detecting system changes as required.  
 
4.2.2 Self-healing server: 
The self-healing server consists of a number of functions. The implementation of the 
functions is detailed in this section. 
4.2.2.1  Log analyser  
As mentioned earlier the alerts generated by the HIDS are scattered in a number of tables 
and some fields hold more than one piece of information. Therefore, the log analyser was 
developed so that it can parse the information given by the alerts and then identifies the 
relevant information to be used by the different modules. It extracts the machine IP 
address, the file path of the newly added file and the integrity change of the Files and/or 
registry keys. This is the information that the self-healing server uses to issue commands. 
For this function to work, the two different SQL statements below have been constructed 
based on tables relations seen in Figure 4.2. 
   $sql = "SELECT data.full_log,location.name from data, alert, 
location where data.full_log LIKE 'Integrity%' AND data.id=alert.id 
AND alert.location_id=location.id  "; 
 SQL statement used for finding integrity alerts and changes 
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   $sql = "SELECT data.full_log,location.name from data, alert, 
location where data.full_log LIKE 'New file%' AND data.id=alert.id 
AND alert.location_id=location.id "; 
 SQL statement used for finding new files alerts added to OS 
4.2.2.2 Integrity changes 
As the first part of the self-healing server tasks is to extract the alerts and understand the 
logs generated by the HIDS, the next function is to sort the results into two different 
categories. The changes are ether integrity related or new files added to the OS. Therefore, 
two functions are created to handle those categories. The first function extracts the 
integrity changes and defines the type and location of the change. Then it sorts this 
information and saves it in a “file.dat” with the prefix of the IP address of the machine e.g.  
“192.168.0.12-intergity.dat”. This file is then stored in a specific folder with read only 
permissions. The folder name is the IP address of the machine. It then adds the IP address 
of the machine into the “iplist-intergity.dat” file to be contacted later on. The pseudo code 
for the integrity changes functions is: 
 
1: BEGIN 
2:    Query integrity changes form HIDS database 
3:       WHILE there are rows DO 
4:          Split Rows to get IP address of machines & what has changed. 
5:          $pcIP ← Extract IP address, row[1] 
6:           Store IP address in iplist-integrity.dat 
7:           $filepath ← Extract Integrity Changes, row[0]  
8:           IF file $pcip-integrity.dat does not exist  
9:                   Create new file $pcip-integrity.dat 
10:            END IF 
11:            Add changes to $pcip-integrity.dat 
12:         END WHILE 
13:       Remove duplicates from iplist-intergrity.dat 
14:   END 
 
Figure 4.6  Integrity extracting algorithm Pseudo code 
Figure 4.7 illustrates details of the integrity extracting algorithm used in the self-healing 
server. 
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Begin
Parse Row and 
identify IP and 
change
Split rows ( IP and 
Changes)
Store ips in Datafile
Create new file 
Ipaddress.dat
Bulid Instructions to 
be sent to 
communicator
Store data in 
ipaddress.dat
End
Iplist.dat
HIDS Database
Get Integrity Logs
(alerts)
Is there any/
more rows?
YES
NO
 
Figure 4.7 Integrity extracting algorithm 
The server then calls the next function which handles new files added to system OS. 
4.2.2.3 New Files added to OS: 
In this subroutine the function starts by sorting all the logs alerts that are related to newly 
added files to the OS folder. It extracts the location and name of the file and then stores 
the information in a prefixed IP address file name with a suffix of the newfiles.dat e.g. 
“192.168.0.12-newfiles.dat”. This file is then stored in a read only folder that named after 
the IP address of the machine in question. The function then adds the IP address of the 
machine in the file named “IP-list-newfiles.dat” to be used by the other modules. Below is 
the pseudo code for new files extraction and Figure 4.9 illustrates the new files added to OS 
extracting algorithm. 
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1. BEGIN 
2. Query New files added to OS form HIDS database 
3. WHILE there are rows do 
4.       Split Rows to get IP address of the machines & what   is added    
5.       $pcIP ← Extract IP address, row [1] 
6.        Store IP address in iplist-Newfile.dat 
7.        $filepath ← Extract New files added and path, row [0] 
8.        IF file $pcip-newfiles.dat does not exist  
9.           Create new file $pcip-newfiles.dat 
10.        END IF 
11.        Add changes to $pcip-newfiles.dat 
12.  END WHILE 
13.  Remove duplicates from iplist-newfiles.dat 
14.  END 
 
Figure 4.8 New files added extracting algorithm Pseudo code 
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Figure 4.9 New files added to OS extracting algorithm 
 
4.2.2.4 The communication module: 
This communication module or ‘the communicator’ is responsible of reading the “iplist.dat” 
files that are generated from the previous functions and contacting the agents on the 
machines in question. Figure 4.10 details the communication sequence.  
Begin
Parse Row and 
identify IP and File 
path
Split rows ( IP and 
File)
Store ips in Datafile
Create new file 
Ipaddress-
Newfiles.dat
Bulid Instructions to 
be sent to 
communicator
Store data in 
ipAddress-
Newfiles.dat
End
Iplist.dat
HIDS Database
Get new files added 
Logs
(alerts)
Is there any/
more rows?
YES
NO
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Start
Read  iplist for new 
files.dat
Is there an IP?
Open Connection 
sockets
Yes
Send Instruction to 
Agent
Get Response
Is Response = 
ok?
NoYES
Sleep for 20 
Seconds
Read IP list for 
Integrity changes
Counter =0
Counter ++
No
Counter =2
Stop
YES
NO
Alert Admin
Log
Get Next IP
Log Report
Get Next IP
 
Figure 4.10 Communication sequence algorithm 
The communicator reads the “IPlist.dat” file and checks if there is any information saved 
there. If there is any information saved in the file, it reads the IP address saved in the 
iplist.dat file. It then opens a connection socket in order to send the instructions to the 
agent and waits for the response from the agent. If the response is ok, it logs the report 
and repeat the process for the other IP address saved in file. If the response is negative, it 
logs the report and repeats the process. If it finds no IP address in the iplist.dat file for the 
new files, it sleeps for 20 seconds and then reads the “iplist.dat” for integrity changes and 
performs the same checks as when it read the iplist.dat for the new files.  
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1: BEGIN 
2: Counter =0 
3: Read IPList File (for new files) 
4: IF  there are IP addresses 
5:      Open connection sockets 
6:      Send Instruction to Agent    
7:      Get Response 
8:      IF Response ≠ okay Then  
9:           Alert admin  
10:           Log IP address to log file 
11:      END IF  
12:      Log report  
13:       Go to STEP 4 
14: ELSE { 
15:     Counter =++  
16:     IF counter ==2 
17:          GO TO STEP 22 
18:     ELSE  
19:         Sleep for 20 seconds       
20:         Read IP List for Integrity changes 
21:         GO TO STEP  4 
22:   END 
 
Figure 4.11 Communication algorithm Pseudo code  
 
4.2.2.5 The Reporting module: 
This component is responsible of the after-action reports and log rotation. It stores all the 
status reports sent from agents along with the IP address, the type of task and whether it 
was accomplished successfully or not. Each report is time stamped. Once the cycle has 
completed, (e.g. next report is due) the old reports have a timestamp and date stamp in file 
name. It also compress the old files to .gz and moves them to the Archive folder. This 
allows the Administrator to go back in time to recheck a specific IP or task. 
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4.2.3 The Self-healing Agent: 
The self-healing agent is a domain running service running on all the domain workstations. 
This service can be configured to run using the GPO (Group Policy Object) in the active 
directory. Similar to the self-healing server it is coded using Perl language. This takes 
advantage of speed and low resources utilization characteristics of the language. This 
section details the algorithms built for the self-healing agent. 
Just like the server, the agent have a communication module. This module ensures that the 
machine is always listening on port 7777 for instructions. Once the agent receives the 
instruction, it determines what algorithm to follow. If the instruction received is related to 
integrity check, it will initiate the integrityfix() function.  
Since the Self-healing system is designed to allow read only access to the folder associated 
with the IP address of the machine to be healed. The integrity fix function starts by 
verifying the IP of the host machine. Once the IP address is determined, it locates the folder 
associated with its own IP address in the self-healing server and reads the files saved there 
line by line. The agent determines the file integrity change and the registry change. It then 
gets all the PIDs and names of running processes and compares them to the white listed 
processes. These white listed processes must not be killed, such processes are the HIDS 
agent and self-healing agent. Once it identifies the white listed processes it force kills all 
the other running processes. Figure 4.12 shows kill process used.  
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Figure 4.12 Force Kill PID algorithm 
 
Since the self-healing server is a Linux based, the syntax used in file path differs from that 
used in windows OS system. Therefore, the Agent first swaps slashes from “/ “ to “\” in 
order to locate the file needed. The next step is to check the location of the file, this is 
important as the process of healing the file will differ if it is inside the system32 folder. The 
reason is that MS Windows have a hidden folder %SystemRoot%\System32\DllCache that 
runs as a backup for the system files in system32 folder, the OS will copy automatically any 
deleted file in the system32.Therefore, the self-healing agent renames the target file in the 
system32 to filename.old, force deletes the file located in the DllCache folder then copies 
the genuine file to DllCache folder ,sleeps for 5 seconds (to give time for the system to 
copy) then copies the genuine file again to system32 folder. It then cleans the leftovers by 
deleting filename.old. The agent checks if there are any errors. If an error is encountered, 
the agent notifies the self-healing server and then initiates the quarantine function to 
change the IP of the machine to 10.0.0.X and have it connected to a quarantined network.   
Get all Running 
process
X =  number of 
running 
processes
Counter =0
Counter ++
Counter < x
YES
Get next 
process name
Process name 
found in 
whitlist?
Force Kill 
Process
YESNoEND
Start
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1: BEGIN 
2: Set counter =0; X= number of running processes  
3: Counter ++ 
4: IF Counter < X then  
5:    Get Next PID name    
6:    Check if PID is whitelisted  
7:    IF PID is White listed  
8:        GO TO 3  
9:    ELSE  
10:      Force Kill PID 
11:      GO TO 3  
12:  ELSE  
13: END 
 
Figure 4.13 Force killing process Pseudo code 
 
If the file integrity change has been located in other folders other than the system32 folder, 
it force removes the file then copies the genuine file from the self-healing repository to the 
target path. 
On the other hand, if the integrity change is related to the windows OS registry, the agent 
locates if there are any values added to the Run or Runonce keys. Since most of bot 
infections add values to have it run on boot, the Agent removes the added entries. Figure 
4.14 illustrates the integrity fix function.  
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Figure 4.14 Integrity Fix algorithm 
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If the self-healing server instructed the Agent to remove any added files to the windows 
OS, the Agent initiates the removefiles(). Just like integrityfix(), it identifies its own local IP 
address, locates the folder associated with the IP address and reads the file prefixed 
ipaddress-newfiles.dat. It then reads all the lines in the ipaddress-newfiles.dat and calls the 
Killallprocess(). It swaps the slashes so that the lines read can be understandable by the 
windows OS then force deletes the file. If the file is removed it reports to server that the 
file is removed and task has been completed successfully. If there are any errors it returns 
the status to the server before quarantining the machine.  
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Figure 4.15 Integrity fix algorithm Pseudo code 
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Figure 4.16 Remove Files algorithm 
Start
Read newfiles 
file.dat
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)
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(!EOF)
Swap 
Slashs / \ / \
Force delete file 
Files 
removed?
YES
YES
Set status =1
Report Status to 
server
Set status =0
Report status
Change IP 
address to 
10.0.0.X
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1: BEGIN 
2: Get local IP address 
3: Locate own folder in self-healing server 
4: Read newfiles file.dat 
5: Run KillAllprocess() function    
6: IF EOF then GO TO 16 
7: ELSE 
8: Change path convention format (swap slashes) 
9: Force delete file 
10: IF file is not removed { 
11:       Set status =0 
12:       Return Status to server and change ip to quarantined  
13: ELSE  
14:  Set stats =1  
15:  GO TO 6  
16:  Report status to server 
17: END 
 
Figure 4.17 Remove Files algorithm Pseudo code   
 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter details the implementation process of the self-healing framework. It covers in 
detail all the modules that were built to interact with each other in order to achieve a 
working self-healing framework. The work in this chapter is presented based upon the 
development process followed during the implementation stage of the study. The 
detection module is explained first detailing all the changes in configuration that were 
implemented in the HIDS to enable efficient botnet infection detection. It also explains why 
the specific type of HIDS was chosen and how data is collected and managed in case of a 
detection. Then the self-healing framework components; self-healing server and self-
healing agent implementation process is explained with presentations of flowcharts and 
pseudo codes of algorithms developed. Different algorithms and functions were developed 
for the different modules in both the server and agent. The flowcharts and pseudo codes of 
the algorithms are used to give an understanding of how information is carried from one 
module to another for smooth operation of the design.  
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Chapter 5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The main test bed used in the experiments simulates an enterprise network running with 
all the main components. Figure 5.1  represents the main test bed used. Additional parts 
are added to the test bed based on the type of the botnet.  
Figure 5.1 Experiments Test bed 
 
The test bed consists of DHCP server, DNS server, Domain controller, 16 workstations 
running on three main PCs (illustrated as blocks) under VMware [95]. An industrial HP 
Procurve [96] managed switch is used to monitor all the network traffic by assigning a 
monitoring port. And finally self-healing framework, which consists of MySQL server, File 
server, HIDS server, Self-healing server. Additional tools were used such as Wireshark [95] 
and Volatility which is a completely open collection of tools for the extraction of digital 
artifacts from memory (RAM) [97].  The machines used in the experiment are shown in the 
following table: 
Machine Type Hardware Description Usage 
Virtual machine container 1 
Dell Precision, 
T3400,Intel Quad-core , 
Q6600,4GB Ram , 1Gb 
network Card 
Running 6 workstations 
simultaneously with 
agents installed 
HIDS Server
MySQL Server
Self healing Server
File Server (Image container) 
DC
DHCP
DNS
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Virtual machine container 2 
Dell Precision, 
T3400,Intel Quad-core , 
Q6600,2GB Ram , 1Gb 
network Card 
Running 3 workstations 
simultaneously with 
agents installed 
Virtual machine container 3 
Lenovo Idea pad Yoga, 
Intel® Core™ i7-
3517U,8GB DDR3L - 
1600Mhz memory,1GB 
network card  
 
Running 7 workstations 
simultaneously with 
agents installed 
MS Windows 2008 Server 
Dell Precision, 
T3400,Intel Quad-core , 
Q6600,2GB Ram , 1Gb 
network card 
Domain controller, 
Active directory, DHCP 
Server, DNS server  
Linux Mint 
Intel Core 2 Duo 
processor P7370 (2.0 
GHz), 3 MB L2 cache, 
1066 MHz, 8GB 
Memory.   
Self-healing server 
MySQL 
OSSEC server 
Linux CentOS 6 
Dell Precision, 
T3400,Intel Quad-core , 
Q6600,2GB Ram , 1Gb 
network Card 
IRC Server 
(UnrealIRCd) 
Linux Ubuntu 
Dell OptiPlex 745, Intel® 
Core™ 2 Duo 
1066MHz,2GB 
Wireshark traffic 
monitor  
Off-site CentOS 6  Server 
VPS-Linux Centos 1GB 
RAM 
MySQL server 
Http botnet C&C 
Network Switch ProCurve series 2900 
Table 5.1 Hardware specifcations of the testbed network nodes 
The test bed was setup to simulate the behaviour of a normal enterprise network setting. 
The MS Windows 2008 Server run the listed fundamental components of the enterprise 
network while the virtual machines run different workstations connected to the domain 
using the Windows Server through the switch (HP Procurve). This environment was setup 
and worked as an enterprise network with 16 domain controlled workstations before the 
introduction of the self-healing framework. The self-healing server component of the 
designed framework sat on an independent machine in the network so that its operations 
didn’t affect the operations of the other servers in the enterprise network.   
The two test scenarios used to verify the designed framework were chosen based on the 
common types of botnets. HTTP and IRC type botnets are very common since they are easy 
to setup and manage. HTTP based botnets are quite hard to guard against since they use 
the essential Port 80 for their communications while IRC is easiest and most common 
protocol used by botmasters.  
An IRC and HTTP botnet were used to test the design in scenarios Alfa and Bravo 
respectively using the setup test bed. Each scenario went through three phases. In each 
phase the system state was captured, analysed and the results were compared. The 
following figure illustrates the experiments phases.  
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Figure 5.2 Experiment Phases 
 
5.2 Scenario Alfa: IRC bot (RxBot) 
The first scenario involved having all the workstations in the test bed infected with an IRC 
botnet. This required the introduction of two other components to the test bed which were 
an IRC server running on Linux Centos 6 and Traffic monitoring machine running Wireshark 
on Linux OS to capture all the traffic passed in the network. UnrealIRCd [98]  which is an 
open-source IRC server daemon was used. Once installed, an initial test was carried out by 
using an open source IRC client to make sure that the IRC server was running with no 
issues. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the test bed for this experiment.  
 
Figure 5.3 IRC botnet test bed 
The next step was to configure the bots binary file with the IRC server address and channel 
the infected nodes needed to join in order to receive instructions and provide report or any 
data extracted from the infected machine. In this experiments all the bots are asked to join 
a channel called “botnet” on the IRC server. Figure 5.4 shows the botnet configuration file. 
Phase 1 
•System state before infection 
Phase 2 
•System state after infection 
phase 3 
•System state after self-healing  
HIDS Server
MySQL Server
Self healing Server
File Server (Image container) 
DC
DHCP
DNS
Monitoring Port
IRC Botnet 
Server
Wireshark Traffic Monitor
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Once the machines in the test bed were infected with the IRC botnet, they were able to 
communicate and log into the channel “botnet” on the IRC server and then wait for further 
instructions. Figure 5.5 shows the bots connected to the IRC channel.  
 
Figure 5.4 IRC botnet configuration code 
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Figure 5.5 bots connected to botnet channel. 
This section covers the analysis of a famous IRC botnet, which as at the time of this thesis is 
still in use. The analysis covers the state of the machine prior infection, after infection and 
after healing.  
5.2.1 Phase 1: System state before infection.  
1- Image info: This provides the general info of the RAW memory dump. This is useful 
during the analysis of the system as it helps in determining which machine is being 
examined and the state (as in prior infection/infected or healed). 
Image info 
Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
 
          Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated 
with WinXPSP2x86) 
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/RxBot/DELL-11-20131126-
164733b4InfectRx.raw) 
                      PAE type : PAE 
                           DTB : 0x70d000L 
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0 
          Number of Processors : 1 
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3 
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000 
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000 
           Image date and time : 2013-11-26 16:47:46 UTC+0000 
     Image local date and time : 2013-11-26 16:47:46 +0000 
 
2- Active connections: This shows if there is any established connection between the 
current machine and a server. This is a useful step in spotting any unusual 
connections.  
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Figure 5.6 Volatility- Active Connection Prior infection 
 
As can be seen from the figure above, there is no established live connection originating 
from or to this machine. A closer look can be achieved by using the connscan parameter 
in Volatility. 
3- Connection Scan: This finds connection structures using pool tag scanning. It finds 
artifacts from previous connections that have since been terminated.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Volatility- Connection Scan - Prior infection 
All the connections shown in the image above were normal as no peculiar connections 
were noticed. 
4-  Process list: This parameter lists the processes of the examined system.  
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Figure 5.8 Volatility- Process List Prior infection 
 
5- Process Scan: This finds processes that were previously terminated (inactive) and 
processes that have been hidden or unlinked by a rootkit. 
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Figure 5.9 Volatility- Process Scan Prior infection 
Since there was no suspected or detected malicious activity. There was no need to dig 
further in this RAW image dump. The network traffic of Wireshark was also examined and 
did not show any suspected malicious traffic. 
5.2.2 Phase 2: System state after infection 
1- Image info: 
Image info 
 Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
 
          Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with 
WinXPSP2x86) 
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/RxBot/DELL-11-20131126-
165010AfterInfectRxbot.raw) 
                      PAE type : PAE 
                           DTB : 0x70d000L 
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0 
          Number of Processors : 1 
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3 
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000 
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000 
           Image date and time : 2013-11-26 16:50:12 UTC+0000 
     Image local date and time : 2013-11-26 16:50:12 +0000 
 
2- Active connections:  
The below figure illustrates that an active connection between the machine and the 
server with the IP 192.168.0.2, which is the botnet command and control IRC server that 
was setup for this experiment.  
 
Figure 5.10 Volatility- Active Connection Post infection 
In this experiment the machine in question connected to 192.168.0.2 on 
port 6667 which was the listening port for the IRC server.  
The PID 1428, the process ID of the process that initiated this connection 
was noted for further investigation.  
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3- Connection Scan:  
This displayed the terminated connections and from the image, all the 
communication listed were genuine domain communications expect for the 
highlighted one. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Volatility- Connection Scan Post infection 
 
4- Process Scan:  
Comparing the scan taken after infection with the one taken before infection, 
the highlighted process in Figure 5.12 was noticed to have been added. This 
led to a deduction that it could be a malicious process that was added into 
the system after infection. Since RxBot is known to for its ability to create 
random process names on the infected machine, this added process was 
what was created by the bot for the infected machine and is therefore 
investigated further.  
0x02f29140 kbenzk.exe   1428    844 0x0a4802a0 2013-11-26 
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Figure 5.12 Volatility- Process Scan Post infection. 
5- Process Tree: 
Further investigation of the memory dump showed the process tree which 
provided more information about the process listed above.  
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Figure 5.13 Volatility- Process Tree Post infection 
As can be seen from the process tree above, this process has the PID Id 
number 1428 which is the same PID Id for the process that initiated the 
network connections (section 2 and 3 above). 
6- Getsids:  
The getsids command can be used to view SIDs (Security Identifiers) associated with a 
process. This helps in identifying processes which have maliciously escalated privileges. So 
using this command to further investigate the PID 1428 showed: 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-21-405887614-2496201998-502834940-513 (KRBTGT) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-1-0 (Everyone) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-32-545 (Users) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-4 (Interactive) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-11 (Authenticated Users) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-5-0-68154 (Logon Session) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-2-0 (Local (Users with the ability to log in locally)) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-21-405887614-2496201998-502834940-520 (KRBTGT) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-21-405887614-2496201998-502834940-512 (KRBTGT) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-21-405887614-2496201998-502834940-518 (KRBTGT) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-21-405887614-2496201998-502834940-519 (KRBTGT) 
kbenzk.exe (1428): S-1-5-21-405887614-2496201998-502834940-572 (KRBTGT) 
 
From the details above, the process is seen to have administrator privileges.  
7- DLLlist: 
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The command dlllist can be used to display the process's loaded DLLs. It goes through the 
doubly-linked list of LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY structures which are pointed to by the PEB's 
InLoadOrderModuleList [99]. DLLs are automatically added to this list when a process calls 
LoadLibrary (or some derivative such as LdrLoadDll) and they aren't removed until 
FreeLibrary is called and the reference count reaches zero. It was noticed that there was an 
addition to the dlllist List compared with the image taken before the infection:  
kbenzk.exe pid:   1428 
Command line : C:\WINDOWS\system32\kbenzk.exe 264 "C:\evil2.exe" 
Service Pack 3 
 
Base             Size  LoadCount Path 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---- 
0x00400000    0x7f000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\kbenzk.exe 
0x7c900000    0xaf000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll 
0x7c800000    0xf6000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll 
0x7e410000    0x91000       0x4e C:\WINDOWS\system32\user32.dll 
0x77f10000    0x49000       0x3a C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll 
0x71ab0000    0x17000       0x30 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ws2_32.dll 
0x77dd0000    0x9b000      0x128 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll 
0x77e70000    0x92000       0x68 C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll 
0x77fe0000    0x11000       0x47 C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll 
0x77c10000    0x58000       0x6b C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll 
0x71aa0000     0x8000       0x32 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll 
0x771b0000    0xaa000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\wininet.dll 
0x77a80000    0x95000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\CRYPT32.dll 
0x77b20000    0x12000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSASN1.dll 
0x77120000    0x8b000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll 
0x774e0000   0x13d000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll 
0x77f60000    0x76000        0xc C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll 
0x773d0000   0x103000        0x3 
C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-
Controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.2600.5512_x-ww_35d4ce83\comctl32.dll 
0x7c9c0000   0x817000        0x6 C:\WINDOWS\system32\shell32.dll 
0x5d090000    0x9a000        0x4 C:\WINDOWS\system32\comctl32.dll 
0x71ad0000     0x9000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\wsock32.dll 
0x74290000     0x4000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\icmp.dll 
0x76d60000    0x19000        0x5 C:\WINDOWS\system32\iphlpapi.dll 
0x5b860000    0x55000        0x5 C:\WINDOWS\system32\netapi32.dll 
0x76f20000    0x27000        0x3 C:\WINDOWS\system32\dnsapi.dll 
0x71b20000    0x12000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\mpr.dll 
0x74320000    0x3d000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\odbc32.dll 
0x763b0000    0x49000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\comdlg32.dll 
0x00a70000    0x17000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\odbcint.dll 
0x73b80000    0x12000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\avicap32.dll 
0x76b40000    0x2d000        0x4 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll 
0x77c00000     0x8000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll 
0x75a70000    0x21000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSVFW32.dll 
0x71a50000    0x3f000        0x4 C:\WINDOWS\system32\mswsock.dll 
0x662b0000    0x58000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\hnetcfg.dll 
0x71a90000     0x8000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\System32\wshtcpip.dll 
0x76ee0000    0x3c000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\RASAPI32.DLL 
0x76e90000    0x12000        0x3 C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasman.dll 
0x76eb0000    0x2f000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\TAPI32.dll 
0x76e80000     0xe000        0x3 C:\WINDOWS\system32\rtutils.dll 
0x77c70000    0x24000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\msv1_0.dll 
0x722b0000     0x5000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\sensapi.dll 
0x769c0000    0xb4000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\USERENV.dll 
0x76fb0000     0x8000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\System32\winrnr.dll 
0x76f60000    0x2c000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WLDAP32.dll 
0x751d0000    0x1e000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\wshbth.dll 
0x77920000    0xf3000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\SETUPAPI.dll 
0x76fc0000     0x6000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasadhlp.dll 
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8- Wireshark traffic:  
Monitoring the traffic provided the details of the communication between the infected 
nodes and the IRC server (command and control centre).In the following figure, the 
communications of interest are highlighted.  
 
Figure 5.14 Wireshark screen shot post infection 
9- IRC server: 
Figure 5.15 shows that all the infected machines have connected to the IRC botnet 
Command and control Centre successfully. The botnets are ready for any further 
instructions. Each infected machine have a unique id/name.  
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Figure 5.15 IRC server channel showing bots connected 
Having studied the Memory Images before and after the infection on the system, it can be 
concluded that the Rxbot creates a random executable file and runs at start-up. This file 
has different names on each infected machine and is added to the Windows registry.  
5.2.3 Phase 3: System state after self-healing: 
1- Image info 
Image info 
 Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
 
          Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 
(Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86) 
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace /RxBot/DELL-11-
20131126-170735afterHealing.raw) 
                      PAE type : PAE 
                           DTB : 0x70d000L 
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0 
          Number of Processors : 1 
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3 
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000 
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000 
           Image date and time : 2013-11-26 17:07:37 UTC+0000 
     Image local date and time : 2013-11-26 17:07:37 +0000 
 
 
2- Active connections:  
The below figure shows there is no active connection between the examined machine and 
the server with the IP 192.168.0.2, which is the botnet command and control IRC server 
that the author has setup for this experiment. The memory dump of the live (current) 
connection of system after healing shows no established connections with the Botnet 
command and control centre. 
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Figure 5.16 Volatility- Active Connection – After healing 
3- Connection Scan:   
 
Figure 5.17 Volatility- Connection Scan – After healing 
 
 
 
 
4- Process scan: 
The process scans and process list memory dump show that the process 
PID 1428 no longer exists on the node. This indicates that kbenzk.exe PID:   
1428   was removed from the system. 
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Figure 5.18 Volatility- Process Scan – After healing 
 
5- Process Tree: 
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Figure 5.19 Volatility- Process Tree- After healing 
6- Process List: 
 
Figure 5.20 Volatility- Process List - After healing 
The dlllist and getsids parameters were examined and there was no indication of existence 
PID number 1428. 
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Figure 5.21 Volatility- Dllist and getsids – After healing 
 
7- Wireshark Traffic: 
The examined traffic did not show any traffic initiating to or from the healed machines 
other than the normal traffic. There was no connection of any kind made between IRC 
server and the healed node. The Figure 5.22 illustrates the use of packet flitter to filter all 
the traffic using the protocol IRC and have the ip.address == 192.168.0.11. 
The traffic also showed no other connections between the previously infected nodes and 
the IRC server. Further investigation as shown in Figure 5.23 showed that the server had 
lost all the connections. 
 
Figure 5.22 Wireshark screen shot showing no traffic after healing 
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Figure 5.23 IRC server channel after healing 
  
Chapter 5 
  81 
  
5.3 Scenario Bravo: HTTP Bot (WarBot) 
For this scenario, all the workstations were infected with an HTTP botnet. This setup was 
more complicated due to the fact the HTTP botnet checks for internet access due to the 
nature that it is contacting a website to resolve its own public IP address. For this setup, a 
public botnet command and control server was setup publicly on the internet. This was 
done on a private server to avoid any legal issues.  
The gateway was added to the test bed to allow the workstations to communicate with the 
command and control centre. Figure 5.24 shows the test bed used in this scenario. 
The WarBot botnet uses a database, therefore, MySQL server was setup on the command 
and control server. This botnet makes use of the database for storing bots information, 
tasks, usernames and passwords 
 
Figure 5.24 WarBot botnet test bed 
 
Once the command and control centre was up and running, the botnet binary executable 
was created and configured. Figure 5.25 shows the binary configuration. The configuration 
included a time interval that defined when the bots would check for instructions from the 
command and control centre. 
HIDS Server
MySQL Server
Self healing Server
File Server (Image container) 
DC
DHCP
DNS
Monitoring Port
Wireshark Traffic Monitor
HTTP Botnet Server 
(Warbot)
Internet
Gateway
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DROP VIEW IF EXISTS `v_bots_command_log`;CREATE ALGORITHM=UNDEFINED 
DEFINER=CURRENT_USER SQL SECURITY DEFINER VIEW `v_bots_command_log` AS select 
`bots_command_log`.`CommandLogID` AS `CommandLogID`,`bots_command_log`.`BotID` 
AS `BotID`,`bots_command_log`.`CommandID` AS 
`CommandID`,`bots_command_log`.`RunDate` AS `RunDate`,`commands`.`CommandString` 
AS `CommandString`,`Bots`.`UniqueID` AS `UniqueID`,`Bots`.`Country` AS 
`Country`,`Bots`.`OSVerMajor` AS `OSVerMajor`,`Bots`.`OSVerMinor` AS 
`OSVerMinor`,`Bots`.`BotVerMajor` AS `BotVerMajor`,`Bots`.`BotVerMinor` AS 
`BotVerMinor`,`Bots`.`LastReq_Date` AS `LastReq_Date` from ((`bots_command_log` join 
`commands` on((`bots_command_log`.`CommandID` = `commands`.`CommandID`))) join 
`Bots` on((`bots_command_log`.`BotID` = `Bots`.`BotID`))); 
 
 
Figure 5.25 Binary Configuration - WarBot botnet 
 
Once both the server and bot binary were configured, it was tested to ensure that the bots 
were registering with the command and control server. 
5.3.1 Phase 1 System state before infection 
1- Image info: As noted in scenario Alfa, the image provides general info of the RAW 
memory dump. This is useful during the analysis of the system as the machine ID 
and the machine status are determined from this information displayed. This 
information is captured during each state. 
 
Image info 
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Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
 
          Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated 
with WinXPSP2x86) 
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (DELL-23-20131203-
105225.raw) 
                      PAE type : PAE 
                           DTB : 0x70d000L 
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0 
          Number of Processors : 1 
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3 
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000 
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000 
           Image date and time : 2013-12-03 10:52:26 UTC+0000 
     Image local date and time : 2013-12-03 10:52:26 +0000 
 
2- Active connections: This showed healthy live established connection between the 
current machine and any other nodes, therefore, Figure 5.26 shows that there is no 
malicious connection established. 
 
Figure 5.26 Volatility- Active Connection - Prior Infection 
3- Connection Scan: By using the parameter connscan in Volatility to find connection 
structures using pool tag scanning, the artifacts from previous connections that 
have since been terminated are seen in the image below.  
 
Figure 5.27 Connection Scan - Prior Infection 
All the connections shown are normal traffic so no malicious traffic was detected.  
4- Process list: This parameter lists the processes of the examined system which are 
seen below for the clean state. 
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Figure 5.28 Volatility Process List - Prior Infection 
5- Process Scan: This finds processes that were previously terminated (inactive) and 
processes that have been hidden or unlinked by a rootkit. 
 
Figure 5.29 Volatility Process scan - Prior Infection 
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Figure 5.30 Volatility Process Tree - Prior Infection 
All this information is captured during the clean state so that it can be used for comparison 
against the information gathered after infection and after healing to validate the designed 
system. 
5.3.2 Phase 2: System state after infection 
6- Image info: 
Image info 
 Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
 
          Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated 
with WinXPSP2x86) 
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (DELL-23-20131204-
234057.raw) 
                      PAE type : PAE 
                           DTB : 0x70d000L 
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0 
          Number of Processors : 1 
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3 
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000 
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000 
           Image date and time : 2013-12-04 23:40:58 UTC+0000 
     Image local date and time : 2013-12-04 23:40:58 +0000 
 
7- Active connections: The below figure illustrates that there is an active connection 
between the infected machine and the server using the IP 188.121.62.233 on 
port 80.Since this public IP belongs to the test bed which was setup as the 
command and control server of this botnet, this is a bot activity originating from 
the infected machine to the botnet command and control centre.   
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Figure 5.31 Volatility- Active Connections – Infected 
In this experiment the infected machine connected to 188.121.62.233 on port 
80 which is the listens on this port for commands from botnet server as it 
uses the HTTP protocol. From the captured data, the process ID 1668 is 
responsible for this connection.  
 
8- Connection Scan:   
  
 
Figure 5.32 Volatility- Connection Scan – Infected 
As mentioned earlier this parameter displays any terminated connections, all 
the communication listed above a genuine domain communications expect 
for the highlighted one.  
    
9- Process Scan:  
In Figure 5.33, the PID 1668 belongs to the process smss.exe in MS window. 
Since smss.exe is a genuine name for an executable in Windows, there is 
need for further investigation to ensure that this is indeed a malicious file. 
Therefore the process list and their parent process are closely examined. 
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Figure 5.33 Volatility- Process Scan- Infected 
 
The highlighted process smss.exe  PID 1428 with  PPID 620 initiated the 
connection while the genuine process smss.exe always under the parent PID 
which is “system”. (This can be seen from phase1 image). To further gain 
an understanding of the difference between these two processes, the 
process tree parameter is used.  
 
10- Process Tree: 
 
Examining memory dump provided the process tree which detailed more 
information about the process listed above.  
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Figure 5.34 Volatility- Process Tree – Infected 
As can be seen from the process tree above, the highlighted process has the 
PID ID number 1668 and is a child process under the “explorer” while the 
genuine “smss.exe” is always under the “system” process.  
The dlllist parameter displayed the full path of the process in question. 
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Figure 5.35 Volatility- Process List – Infected 
 
11- DLLlist:  
There was an addition to the dlllist List compared with the image taken before the 
infection: The genuine smss.exe process is located in the \windows\System32\ 
folder. While the malicious smss.exe is located directly under \windows\ folder. 
smss.exe pid:    380 
Command line : \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe 
Base             Size  LoadCount Path 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---- 
0x48580000     0xf000     0xffff \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe 
0x7c900000    0xaf000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll 
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smss.exe pid:   1668 
Command line : "C:\WINDOWS\smss.exe"  
Base             Size  LoadCount Path 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---- 
0x00400000     0x7000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\smss.exe 
0x7c900000    0xaf000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll 
0x7c800000    0xf6000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll 
0x77dd0000    0x9b000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll 
0x77e70000    0x92000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll 
0x77fe0000    0x11000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll 
0x71ab0000    0x17000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll 
0x77c10000    0x58000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll 
0x71aa0000     0x8000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll 
0x771b0000    0xaa000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WININET.dll 
0x77a80000    0x95000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\CRYPT32.dll 
0x77b20000    0x12000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSASN1.dll 
0x7e410000    0x91000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll 
0x77f10000    0x49000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll 
0x77120000    0x8b000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll 
0x774e0000   0x13d000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll 
0x77f60000    0x76000     0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll 
0x773d0000   0x103000        0x4 
C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-
Controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.2600.5512_x-ww_35d4ce83\comctl32.dll 
0x7e1e0000    0xa2000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\urlmon.dll 
0x77c00000     0x8000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll 
0x7c9c0000   0x817000        0x3 C:\WINDOWS\system32\Shell32.dll 
0x5d090000    0x9a000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\comctl32.dll 
0x71ad0000     0x9000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\wsock32.dll 
0x76ee0000    0x3c000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\RASAPI32.DLL 
0x76e90000    0x12000        0x3 C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasman.dll 
0x5b860000    0x55000        0x4 C:\WINDOWS\system32\NETAPI32.dll 
0x76eb0000    0x2f000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\TAPI32.dll 
0x76e80000     0xe000        0x3 C:\WINDOWS\system32\rtutils.dll 
0x76b40000    0x2d000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll 
0x77c70000    0x24000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\msv1_0.dll 
0x76d60000    0x19000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\iphlpapi.dll 
0x722b0000     0x5000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\sensapi.dll 
0x769c0000    0xb4000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\USERENV.dll 
0x71a50000    0x3f000        0x4 C:\WINDOWS\System32\mswsock.dll 
0x76fc0000     0x6000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasadhlp.dll 
0x76f20000    0x27000        0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\DNSAPI.dll 
0x76fb0000     0x8000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\System32\winrnr.dll 
0x76f60000    0x2c000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WLDAP32.dll 
0x751d0000    0x1e000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\wshbth.dll 
0x77920000    0xf3000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\SETUPAPI.dll 
0x662b0000    0x58000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\hnetcfg.dll 
0x71a90000     0x8000        0x1 C:\WINDOWS\System32\wshtcpip.dll 
 
12- Getsids:  
The getsids command was used to further investigate the privileges associated with this file 
and below is the data captured for the process with PID 1668:  
smss.exe (1668): S-1-5-21-725345543-796845957-839522115-500 (Administrator) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-5-21-725345543-796845957-839522115-513 (Domain Users) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-1-0 (Everyone) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-5-32-545 (Users) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-5-4 (Interactive) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-5-11 (Authenticated Users) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-5-5-0-71261 (Logon Session) 
smss.exe (1668): S-1-2-0 (Local (Users with the ability to log in locally)) 
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This showed that the malicious process had administrative privileges. 
13- Wireshark traffic:  
The Figure 5.36 shows the Bot’s registering with the command and control server i.e. 
WarBot server. It is then assigned a unique ID. After the bots have registered successfully, 
they check the command and control server on the interval time they were programmed to 
do so. In case any instructions await the bots action the required task on the next check. In 
the next figures below, the bot is instructed to download a tool that allows the botmaster 
to open a reverse shell directory i.e. Netcat. This example was used in this experiment to 
demonstrate the capabilities of this botnet. Due to this capability the bot controller is able 
perform any function on the infected machine. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.37 , the TCP Stream of the communication between the bot and 
the server was followed. In this figure, the unique id of an infected machine (bot), the 
instructions can be seen in the following format: 
base.download_execture RandomGeneratedName.exe URLofFile 
 
 
Figure 5.36 Wireshark Traffic 
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Figure 5.37 Bot receiving a command to download and execute a file 
 
Figure 5.38 Communication traffic between infected machine and C&C 
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The bot uses a random name generated which makes it harder for the user to notice or 
track the file. The file is downloaded and executed in the background without the 
knowledge of the user. Once the bot receives the instruction it queries the domain that is 
hosting the file. This action is captured using Wireshark, the figures above show the 
communications that the infected machine uses to download and run the file. 
14- WarBot Command and control server: 
To illustrate how effective this botnet is and show the command and control in action, the 
following figure displays that during this experiment 15 bots are ready for the botmaster 
instructions. The instructions can be anything from DDOS, downloading or stealing data.  
 
Figure 5.39 WarBot Botnet command and control centre 
The Figure 5.40 shows how the command and control centre of this http botnet keeps track 
and information of the bots. All the 15 infected machines have been assigned a unique id 
and are stored in MySQL database.  
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Figure 5.40 WarBot MySQL BD: Unique IDs 
 
 
 
Figure 5.41 WarBot MySQL BD: Command Sent to Unique ID 
The MySQL also keeps record of the command instructed to which bot.   
5.3.3 Phase 3: System state after self-healing 
Since the communication pattern of the infected machines and the server they connect to 
were already known, it’s fairly easy to check from the server side and see if there is any 
connected bots or not. In order to validate the designed self-healing framework, it’s 
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important to examine the individual machines and see if there is any malicious process 
running.   
1- Image info  
Image info 
Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with 
WinXPSP2x86) 
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/DELL-23-20131205-
152058.raw) 
                      PAE type : PAE 
                           DTB : 0x70d000L 
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0 
          Number of Processors : 1 
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3 
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000 
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000 
 
2- Active connections:  
 
Figure 5.42 Volatility - Active Connections - After healing 
The figure above illustrates that after activating the self-healing process, there was an 
active connection between the examined machine and the server with the IP 192.168.0.1, 
which is the enterprise domain server, and there is no suspicious activity in the above 
figure.  
3- Connection Scan: 
 
Figure 5.43 Volatility - Connection scan - After healing 
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The above figure shows the connections that had been already terminated, and it was 
safe to say, there was no suspicious activity. The next step was to check the running 
process and see if the rouge smss.exe still existed. 
 
 
 
4- Process scan: 
The only smss.exe in the Figure 5.44 is the genuine process and it’s is 
running under the parent process “system”.  Figure 5.45 displays it in a 
clearer way. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.44 Volatility - Process Scan – After healing 
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5- Process Tree: 
 
 Figure 5.45 Volatility - Process Tree - After healing  
6- Process List: 
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Figure 5.46 Volatility - Process List - After healing 
To confirm that the smss.exe seen in these scans is the genuine the dlllist parameter was 
executed which showed that this process was located under the windows\system32 
directory and therefore genuine.  
7- Wireshark Traffic: 
Figure 5.47 shows that there was no communication between all the healed nodes of any 
kind to the WarBot command and control centre (188.121.62.233). A Wireshark filter 
(ip.addr==188.121.62.233) was applied to display all the traffic coming from and going to 
the command and control centre and no traffic was captured. All the traffic that were 
captured originating from the healed nodes was normal network traffic.  
 
Figure 5.47 Wireshark Traffic – After healing 
 
 
 
5.4 Testing Quarantine Function: 
Since the implementation of the framework was successful in healing the infected nodes, 
the framework did not initiate the quarantine function. Therefore, this function had to be 
tested manually. Different scenarios were implemented to test this function. This was be 
done between the detection phase and the healing phase. The following are the scenarios 
used to test the quarantine function. 
- Renamed botnet binary files manually in the infected machine. 
- Removed botnet binary files manually from the infected machine. 
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- Altered the registry manually in the infected system. 
- Removed registry values manually in the infected system. 
In all the scenarios, the infected nodes was automatically removed from the enterprise 
network and connected to the quarantine network and the status was been sent to the 
self-healing server to generate reports for human intervention. The following figure 
illustrates the quarantined network. 
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Figure 5.48 Quarantined Network 
5.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter details the tests and experiments carried out to validate the designed 
framework.  Two scenarios; Alfa and Bravo which tested the healing of the domain work 
stations after an IRC botnet infection and HTTP botnet infection respectively. The data 
captured and studied during the experiments is also provided. The steps followed through 
the scenarios were kept uniform so that information gathered had integrity. The average 
time taken to heal the 16 nodes used in the test bed after infection was 96 seconds which 
includes the 20 second wait time between tasks which can be reduced. 
To ensure that the nodes were not immediately re-infected after self-healing or that the 
connections were not re-established, the experiment was left running for 72 hours after 
self-healing.  During this time, the traffic was captured using Wireshark which was 
examined in phase 3 of each experiment.  
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The results deduced from the analysis of the experiments in this chapter show that the self-
healing framework designed works efficiently to restore the workstations to the clean state 
after infection.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and future work 
 
6.1 Conclusions  
Cyber-attacks have become one of the most lucrative crimes for cyber criminals as it was 
reported that the estimated cost of cyber-crime in the UK reached £27Bn per annum [100]. 
Personal computers are no longer the main target as it was years ago. The nature of the 
threat is rapidly changing from what used to be script kiddies to nation sponsored attacks 
and in some cases hackers working together to form a cyber-mafia targeting enterprise and 
government networks. Having infected nodes on an enterprise network, cyber criminals 
can generate millions of dollars.  They can also use the enterprise computer resources to 
generate different attacks, steal information and other malicious activities. Although the 
enterprise network has a lot of network resources available for manipulation by crime 
criminals, these resources are also centrally controlled due to the presence of the domain 
controller. This controlled setting means that activities on the network can be monitored 
given that the clean state of the network is known. Self-healing is a mechanism that can be 
used to reverse any suspicious system changes. 
This thesis contributes towards the resilience of enterprise networks against botnet attacks 
through the design, development and analysis of a self-healing framework. The designed 
self-healing framework utilises the key characteristics and attributes of the nature’s 
immune system to fend off botnet attacks. It utilises its four main components to heal the 
infected nodes by replacing the changed/affected system components. The self-healing 
components interact with each other to successful heal or take the infected machine off 
the network in case of unknown errors/obstacles. In event of failed healing, the infected 
machine is taken off the network to prevent it from communicating with other network 
nodes. This prevents the node from infecting other nodes in the network or initiating 
attacks on the network servers. The framework is designed to be integrated into the 
enterprise network security infrastructure. The design takes advantage of HIDS to detect 
any system state changes. The self-healing framework integrated into the network assists 
in maintaining the availability and survivability of the network. The design was tested using 
two of the main types of botnets; IRC and HTTP based botnets. Experiments were run in a 
controlled environment and the self-healing framework achieved 100% detection and 
healing rates for both test scenarios. All the 16 workstations were healed in less than 96 
seconds, which includes the 20 seconds waiting time between tasks in both the test 
scenarios.  
The quarantine function which is implemented when the framework is not able to return 
the infected node to its initial clean state was tested. During the test, the infection machine 
was taken off the main Enterprise network and sent to the quarantined network. By taking 
it off the enterprise network, it lost its ability to communicate with any of the network 
resources or the internet. The node disconnection was logged; information which can later 
be used by the system administrators of the network to intervene.  
Chapter 6 
  102 
  
The success of all the designed components of the self-healing framework shows that the 
framework works and its implementation in an Enterprise Network would make it resilient 
against botnet infection.  
6.2 Current limitations  
Although this study has successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the self-healing 
framework, it has certain limitations. Since the experiments performed in this study was 
validated by analysing the infected node, bot’s command and control centre and network 
traffic, the solution was not tested on other botnets such as Zeus. This is due to not finding 
the source code of the botnet and the command and control centre in order perform the 
experiments in the same procedure to validate the results. 
Due to time constraints, other limitations were faced such as the implementation of a 
ranking node mechanism, graphical reporting system and a self-healing mini-servers. These 
are described in more detail in the future work section. 
6.3 Future work 
The designed framework can be further extended to include some additional functions in 
the network. Some of the identified functions that can be added into the design are 
detailed below: 
6.3.1 Self-healing Mini-servers:  
One of the extensions that can be added to the self-healing framework, is that the nodes 
can act as a mini-self-healing servers and heal other nodes. These nodes can be graded by 
the success/clean rating. Since the human factor plays a major role in infecting the 
workstations, the self-healing server can have a ranking mechanism that is based on the 
statics of a specific node. If a node has a low infection rate, it can act as a mini self-healing 
server and help in generating commands and tasks for the infected node. This is helpful in a 
large enterprise, where some subnets are not physically in the same area or even city of 
the main data centre where the self-healing framework/server is located.  
By adding this functionality to the design, the system uses less bandwidth traffic between 
locations as well as increasing the redundancy of the architecture which makes it more 
reliable due to the increased number of mini-self healing system. This idea was inspired by 
the Waledac bot where infected repeater nodes exchange IP lists with other repeater 
nodes. This can be implement by having the self-healing trusted nods share lists of the IPs 
of the infected machines on the network. Therefore, when a “mini-self-healing” node is 
taken off-line for any reason, other neighbouring nodes can perform the self-healing. 
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Figure 6.1 Mini Self-healing servers 
6.3.2 Ranking nodes: 
This feature will allow the self-healing framework to set scores for each of nodes. 
This is done by ranking/scoring nodes that are infected more often and flagging them as a 
potential network risk. This would help the administrators to interact with the user of this 
node and apply awareness training or disciplinary action if needed. On the other hand, if 
the node scores towards the trusted score, this node can be added to the mini-self-healing 
nodes described above. 
TrustedPotential 
Threat 
 
Figure 6.2 Node ranking 
6.3.3 Reporting system: 
The reporting module of the framework can be improved by the development of a 
webpage that allows the Administrators to set up a scheduled reporting i.e. daily, weekly or 
monthly. A mailing list can be also added to this administrative - reporting webpage. The 
administrator would also use it to generate graphical charts, showing the infection rate, 
healing rate, quarantining rate. In addition to that, reports can be assigned to send detailed 
reports of certain nodes on the network. 
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6.3.4  White-listing:  
This is where administrators adds the names of the certain applications. Although 
the detection module will still produce alerts for administrators if any change happens, 
these application (added to the white list) will not be touched by the self-healing agents. 
The white listing can also be applied on nodes on the network, for example certain 
nodes or servers can be white listed so the healing server will not do any action to the 
machines on the this list. 
6.3.5 Automated Alert 
This can be implemented as notifications for the system administrator when a node 
taken offline and sent to the quarantine network. This can be an SMS or email. This would 
enable a quicker reaction from the system administrator. 
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